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Abstract
This paper studies how a system operator and a set of agents securely execute a distributed projected gradient-based algorithm.
In particular, each participant holds a set of problem coefficients and/or states whose values are private to the data owner. The
concerned problem raises two questions: how to securely compute given functions; and which functions should be computed in
the first place. For the first question, by using the techniques of homomorphic encryption, we propose novel algorithms which
can achieve secure multiparty computation with perfect correctness. For the second question, we identify a class of functions
which can be securely computed. The correctness and computational efficiency of the proposed algorithms are verified by two
case studies of power systems, one on a demand response problem and the other on an optimal power flow problem.
Key words: Distributed optimization; privacy; homomorphic encryption.
1 Introduction
In the last decades, distributed optimization has been
extensively studied and broadly applied to coordinate
large-scale networked systems Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis
(1997), Zhu and Mart´ınez (2015), Bullo et al. (2009). In
distributed optimization, the participants collectively
achieve network-wide goals via certain mechanisms
driven by data sharing between the participants. Such
data sharing, however, causes the concern that private
information of legitimate entities could be leaked to
unauthorized ones. Hence, there is a demand to de-
velop new distributed optimization algorithms that can
achieve network-wide goals and simultaneously protect
the privacy of legitimate entities.
The problem of interest is closely relevant to the one
where a group of participants aim to compute certain
functions over their distributed private inputs such that
each participant’s inputs remain private after the com-
putation. To protect privacy, two questions need to be
answered Lindell and Pinkas (2009): (i) How to securely
compute given functions with distributed private inputs
so that the computation process does not reveal anything
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beyond the function outputs? This question is referred
to as secure multiparty computation (SMC) Hazay and
Lindell (2010), Cramer et al. (2015). (ii) Which func-
tions should be computed in the first place so that the
adversary cannot infer private inputs of benign partici-
pants from function outputs? In this paper, we refer to
this question as input-output inference (IOI).
Literature review on homomorphic encryption. For the
question of SMC, homomorphic encryption is a powerful
tool, and has been applied to various problems including,
e.g., statistical analysis Shi et al. (2011) and data classifi-
cation Yang et al. (2005). It is because homomorphic en-
cryption allows certain algebraic operations to be carried
out on ciphertexts, thus generating an encrypted result
which, when decrypted, matches the result of operations
performed on plaintexts. A detailed literature review on
homomorphic encryption is provided in Section 9.1. It
is worthy to mention that private key fully (and surely
partially) homomorphic encryption schemes and public
key partially homomorphic encryption schemes can be
efficiently implemented (see Section 9.1). Recently, ho-
momorphic encryption has been applied to control and
optimization problems, e.g., potential games Lu and Zhu
(2015b), quadratic programs Shoukry et al. (2016), and
linear control systems Kogiso and Fujita (2015), Farokhi
et al. (2017). Most existing homomorphic encryption
schemes only work for binary or non-negative integers.
In contrast, states and parameters in most distributed
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optimization problems are signed real numbers.
Literature review on IOI. SMC alone is not enough for
data privacy. Even if a computing scheme does not re-
veal anything beyond the outputs of the functions, the
function outputs themselves could tell much information
about the private inputs. This raises the second ques-
tion of IOI. A representative set of papers, e.g., Clark-
son et al. (2009), Mardziel et al. (2011), Mardziel et al.
(2012), adopted the method of belief set. In particu-
lar, each participant maintains a belief which is an es-
timate of the other participant’s knowledge. When the
belief is below certain threshold, the participant con-
tinues computation. Otherwise, the participant rejects
the computation. This approach is only applicable to
discrete-valued problems with constant private inputs.
To the best of our knowledge, the issue of IOI in real-
valued time series, e.g., generated by dynamic systems,
has been rarely studied.
Contributions. This paper investigates how a system op-
erator and a set of agents execute a distributed gradient-
based algorithm in a privacy preserving manner. In par-
ticular, on the one hand, each agent’s state and feasi-
ble set are private to itself and should not be disclosed
to any other agent or the system operator; on the other
hand, each of the agents and the system operator holds
a set of private coefficients of the component functions
and each coefficient should not be disclosed to any par-
ticipant who does not initially hold it. The privacy is-
sue of the gradient-based algorithm is decomposed into
SMC and IOI.
For the question of SMC, we first propose a private
key fully homomorphic encryption scheme to address
the case where jointly computed functions are arbitrary
polynomials and the system operator could only launch
temporarily independent attacks, i.e., at each step of the
gradient-based algorithm, the system operator only uses
the data received at the current step to infer the agents’
current states, but does not use previous data to collec-
tively infer the agents’ states in the past. We notice that
the assumption of temporarily independent attacks is
crucial for the private key homomorphic encryption set-
ting and the security might be compromised if this as-
sumption does not hold. Similar assumptions have been
widely used in database privacy Bhaskar et al. (2011),
Dwork et al. (2005), Zhu et al. (2017). Please refer to
Remark 3.2 for the detailed discussion on this assump-
tion. To deal with real numbers, we propose mechanisms
for transformations between real numbers and integers
as pre and post steps of plain homomorphic encryption
schemes for integers, and provide the condition that the
key should satisfy to guarantee the correctness of decryp-
tion and post-transformation. The proposed technique
to handle real numbers can be applied to arbitrary ho-
momorphic encryption schemes. All the agents encrypt
their states and coefficients by a key which is unknown
to the system operator. The system operator computes
the polynomial functions with the encrypted data and
sends the results to the target agent that initiates the
computation. The target agent can then perform decryp-
tion by the same key. We prove that the algorithm cor-
rectly computes the functions and meanwhile prove by
the simulation paradigm that each agent does not know
anything beyond what it must know (i.e., its inputs and
the outputs of its desirable functions) and it is computa-
tionally hard for the system operator to infer the private
data of the agents.
We then propose a public key partially homomorphic en-
cryption computing algorithm to address the case where
jointly computed functions are affine and the system
operator could launch causal attacks. The secure com-
putation of affine functions is carried out by the Pail-
lier encryption scheme. Similar techniques are applied to
handle real numbers. We prove that the proposed algo-
rithm computes the correct values of the functions and
after the computation, each participant does not learn
anything beyond what it must know and it is computa-
tionally hard for the system operator to distinguish the
private data of the agents.
For the question of IOI, we provide a control-aware defi-
nition which, informally, states that a function is secure
to compute if, given the output of the function, the ad-
versary cannot uniquely determine the private inputs of
any participant and meanwhile the uncertainty about
the inputs is infinite. The definition is inspired by the no-
tion of observability in control theory and is consistent
with the uncertainty based privacy notions in database
analysis Marks (1996), Brodsky et al. (2000). For a class
of quadratic functions, we derive sufficient conditions of
IOI by exploiting the null vectors of the coefficient weight
matrices and the constant terms.
The correctness and computational efficiency are verified
by two case studies of power systems, one on a demand
response problem and the other on an optimal power
flow problem.
In our earlier paper Lu and Zhu (2015b), homomorphic
encryption was applied to discrete potential games. In
Lu and Zhu (2015b), the issue of IOI was not discussed
and the proofs were omitted. The current paper stud-
ies a class of distributed algorithms which have been
widely used to solve distributed optimization, convex
games and stochastic approximation. In the current pa-
per, both the issues of SMC and IOI are studied with
formal proofs. For the issue of SMC, the current paper
adopts two different homomorphic encryption schemes
which are based on some computationally hard problems
and achieve higher privacy level than that of Lu and Zhu
(2015b).
Literature review on other secure computation tech-
niques. Besides homomorphic encryption, several other
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techniques have been adopted to address privacy issues
in control and optimization.
The first branch of works uses differential privacy Dwork
(2006), Dwork and Roth (2014) as the security notion,
e.g., Hale and Egerstedt (2015), Huang et al. (2012), Ny
and Pappas (2014), Han et al. (2017) developed differ-
entially private algorithms for distributed optimization,
consensus and filtering problems, respectively. Differen-
tially private schemes add persistent randomized pertur-
bations into data to protect privacy Geng and Viswanath
(2014). For control systems, such persistent perturba-
tions could potentially deteriorate system performance.
In contrast, homomorphic encryption schemes do not in-
troduce any perturbation and are able to find exact so-
lutions.
The second branch of works uses obfuscation techniques
Dreier and Kerschbaum (2011) to protect coefficient con-
fidentiality for optimization problems in cloud comput-
ing. Related works include, e.g., Borden et al. (2013),
Borden et al. (2012), Wang et al. (2016), which studied
optimal power flow and linear programming problems,
respectively. Existing obfuscation techniques are only
applicable to centralized optimization problems with lin-
ear or quadratic cost functions in order to have the prop-
erty that inverting the linear obfuscation transformation
returns the optimal solution of the original problem.
The third branch of works adopts the techniques of se-
cret sharing, e.g., in our earlier work Lu and Zhu (2015a),
the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme Shamir (1979) was
used to achieve state privacy for distributed optimiza-
tion problems on tree topologies. In Lu and Zhu (2015a),
the functions are restricted to be linear and the privacy
of coefficients is not taken into account.
Notations. The vector 1n denotes the column vector with
n ones. Given a finite index set Ω, let [Ai]i∈Ω denote the
column-wise stack of Ai for all i ∈ Ω, where Ai’s are ma-
trices with the same number of columns. When there is
no confusion in the context, we drop the subscript i ∈ Ω
and use [Ai]. Given matrices A1, · · · , AN with the same
column number, let A−i denote [Aj ]j 6=i. Given matri-
ces A1, · · · , AN , denote by diag{A1, · · · , AN} the block
diagonal matrix for which the sub-matrix on the i-th
diagonal block is Ai and all the off-diagonal blocks are
zero matrices. For a matrix or vector A, ‖A‖ denotes
the 2-norm of A, and ‖A‖max denotes the max norm of
A, i.e., the absolute value of the element of A with the
largest absolute value. For any positive integer n, Rn,
Rn≥0, Rn>0, Zn, Zn≥0 and Zn>0 denote the sets of real, non-
negative real, positive real, integer, non-negative inte-
ger, and positive integer column vectors of size n, respec-
tively. Let N denote the set of natural numbers. Given
w ∈ Z>0, Zw ∆= {0, 1, · · · , w − 1} and Z∗w denotes the
set of positive integers which are smaller than w and do
not have common factors other than 1 with w. Given
a finite set C, denote by |C| its cardinality. Given a
non-empty, closed and convex set Z ⊆ Rm, PZ denotes
the projection operation onto Z, i.e., for any z ∈ Rm,
PZ [z] = argminy∈Z‖y − z‖. The operator mod denotes
the modulo operation such that, given any a, b ∈ Z and b
non-zero, a mod b returns the remainder of a modulo b.
Given any p, q ∈ Z>0, gcd(p, q) and lcm(p, q) denote the
greatest common divisor and the least common multiple
of p and q, respectively. Given a polynomial function f ,
deg(f) denotes the degree of f .
2 Problem formulation
In this section, we first formulate the problem of
gradient-based distributed optimization and its privacy
issues. After that, we discuss the attacker model and
privacy notions. Finally, we propose a mechanism for
transformation between integers and real numbers.
2.1 Gradient-based distributed optimization
Consider a network comprising a set of agents V =
{1, · · · , N} and a system operator (SO). Each agent i
has a state xi = [xi`] ∈ Xi ⊆ Rni , where Xi is the fea-
sible set of xi. Let x = [xi]i∈V ∈ Rn with n =
∑N
`=1 ni.
Throughout the paper, we have the following assump-
tion on the communication topology.
Assumption 2.1 For each i ∈ V, there is an undirected
communication link between agent i and the system op-
erator.
Many networked systems naturally admit a system op-
erator, e.g., Internet, power grid and transportation sys-
tems Wu et al. (2005), Chiang et al. (2007). Assumption
2.1 is widely used in, e.g., network flow control Low and
Lapsley (1999) and demand response Li et al. (2011).
The agents aim to address a distributed optimization
problem by the projected gradient method, i.e., each
agent i updates its state as follows:
xi(k + 1) = PXi [xi(k)− γ(k)Φi(x(k))]. (1)
In (1), k denotes the discrete step index; γ(k) > 0 is
the step size at step k; Φi : Rn → Rni is the first-order
gradient of certain functions with respect to xi. Denote
the `-th element of Φi by Φi`. Notice that Φi in general
depends on the whole x. The agents update their states
by (1) at each step k and aim to achieve convergence of
a solution of the distributed optimization problem.
Remark 2.1 Update rule (1) has been widely used to
solve distributed optimization, convex games, varia-
tional inequalities and stochastic approximation in, e.g.,
Facchinei and Pang (2003), Kushner and Yin (1997),
Zhu and Frazzoli (2016), Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1997)
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and the references therein. The convergence of update
rule (1) is well studied in these references. To guaran-
tee convergence, convexity is usually assumed Bertsekas
and Tsitsiklis (1997), Bertsekas (2009). However, these
references do not consider the privacy issues (identified
next). In the current paper, we assume that the under-
lying distributed optimization problem satisfies existing
conditions for convergence and do not provide any anal-
ysis on convergence issues. Instead, the current paper
solely focuses on the problem of how to carry out (1) in
a privacy preserving manner.
Throughout the paper, we have the following polynomial
function assumption.
Assumption 2.2 For each i ∈ V and each ` ∈
{1, · · · , ni}, function Φi` is a polynomial of x.
Remark 2.2 By DeVore and Lorentz (1993), the alge-
bra of polynomials can approximate any continuous func-
tion over a compact domain arbitrarily well. We refer to
DeVore and Lorentz (1993) for the details of polynomial
approximation. In this paper, we do not consider divi-
sion operations as divisions largely complicate the task of
secure computing algorithm design because existing ho-
momorphic encryption schemes do not directly support
division operations Freris and Patrinos (2016).
2.2 Privacy issues
In this subsection, we identify the privacy issues in the
execution of (1). Denote by CΦ the set of coefficients
of the functions (Φ1, · · · ,ΦN ). For each i ∈ V ∪ {SO},
participant i holds a subset of coefficients of CΦ, denoted
by CiΦ. It holds that
⋃
i∈V∪{SO} C
i
Φ = CΦ. Notice that a
coefficient could be shared by multiple participants.
For each i ∈ V ∪ {SO}, the private data of participant i
includes the following three parts:
• The sequence of its states {xi(k)} (only for i ∈ V).
• Its feasible set Xi (only for i ∈ V).
• The set CiΦ of coefficients it holds (for i ∈ V ∪ {SO}).
For each i ∈ V, its state sequence {xi(k)} and feasi-
ble set Xi should not be disclosed to any other par-
ticipant j ∈ (V ∪ {SO})\{i}. In distributed optimiza-
tion, the state and feasible set of an agent could expose
much information about the agent’s behaviors and thus
should not be leaked to other entities. For example, a
demand response problem involves a set of power cus-
tomers (agents) and a utility company (system opera-
tor). Each customer aims to achieve the optimal power
load such that the total cost induced by disutility and
load charge is minimized and the load benefit is maxi-
mized. This problem can be formulated as a distributed
optimization problem in which each customer’s state is
its power load Li et al. (2011). It has been shown that
power load profiles at a granularity of 15 minutes may
reveal whether a child is left alone at home and at a finer
granularity may reveal the daily routines of customers
Gong et al. (2016). Moreover, each coefficient r ∈ CΦ
should not be disclosed to any participant i ∈ V ∪ {SO}
such that r /∈ CiΦ. The coefficients of a distributed opti-
mization problem are usually related to system parame-
ters and, in some scenarios, it is crucial to keep the sys-
tem parameters private to unauthorized entities. For ex-
ample, an optimal power flow problem involves a set of
power generators (agents) and an energy manager (sys-
tem operator). Each generator aims to find its optimal
mechanical power and phase angle such that the operat-
ing cost is minimized. This problem can be formulated
as a distributed optimization problem in which the con-
straints are affine and the coefficients of the constraints
are the line-dependent parameters of the power system
Wood and Wollenberg (1996). It has been pointed out
that leakage of line-dependent parameters could be fi-
nancially damaging and even cause potential threat to
national security Borden et al. (2013), Borden et al.
(2012).
For each i ∈ V, we assume that the system operator
knows the structure of Φi but is unaware of the values
of x and the coefficients other than CSOΦ . For each step
k, we assume that the step size γ(k) is identical for all
the agents and known to all the agents.
With the privacy issue demonstrated above, it would be
helpful to highlight our secure computation problem by
decomposing the execution of (1) into two parts: the
collective computation part where all participants col-
lectively compute Φi(x(k))’s and the local update part
where each agent i updates its state xi(k); see Fig. 1. In
(1), for each agent i to update xi(k), it needs the value of
Φi(x(k)), whose computation depends on private data of
other participants and thus requires data exchange be-
tween the participants. Once agent i obtains the value
of Φi(x(k)), it can locally update xi(k) by (1). In this
two-part process, the privacy issue raises two questions:
• Secure multiparty computation (SMC): How to se-
curely compute {Φi(x(k))} for each agent i ∈ V such
that agent i knows the correct values of these func-
tions and meanwhile no agent can learn anything be-
yond its function outputs?
• Input-output inference (IOI): Which functions
(Φ1, · · · ,ΦN ) should be computed such that, for each
i ∈ V, for any K ∈ N, by receiving the sequence
{Φi(0), · · · ,Φi(K)}, agent i cannot infer the private
data of other participants?
2.3 Attacker model and privacy notions
In this subsection, we identify the attacker model and
privacy notions adopted in this paper.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the computation problem (1)
In this paper, we are concerned with semi-honest adver-
saries, i.e., any adversary i ∈ V ∪{SO} correctly follows
the algorithm but attempts to use its received messages
throughout the execution of the algorithm to infer other
participants’ private data (Hazay and Lindell (2010),
pp-20). Semi-honest adversary model is broadly used in
SMC Cramer et al. (2015), Hazay and Lindell (2010)
and has been adopted in various applications, e.g., linear
programming, dataset process and consensus Dreier and
Kerschbaum (2011), Freedman et al. (2004), Huang et al.
(2012). Moreover, the system operator is able to eaves-
drop all the communication links while we assume that
any agent cannot eavesdrop the communication links be-
tween other participants. We also assume that the ad-
versaries do not collaborate to infer the information of
benign participants. Instead, if multiple adversaries col-
laborate, they are viewed as a single adversary.
We next introduce the privacy notions adopted in this
paper.
• Privacy notion for SMC. We adopt the standard lan-
guage of view in cryptography to develop the notion.
Consider a set ofM parties where each party i holds a set
of private data, denoted by yi ∈ Rdi . Let y = [yi] ∈ Rd
with d =
∑M
i=1 di. Each party i aims to compute a set
of functions hi : Rd → Rri which depends on the over-
all y. Let h = [hi] : Rd → Rr with r =
∑M
i=1 ri. Let
Π be an algorithm that enables the M parties to col-
lectively compute h. For each party i, its input for Π is
yi. Let ti be the total number of messages received by
party i during the execution of Π and denote these mes-
sages by vi1, · · · , viti . Given y, the view of party i during
the execution of Π, denoted by VIEWΠi (y), is defined as
VIEWΠi (y)
∆
= {yi, vi1, · · · , viti}. To introduce the defini-
tion of privacy for SMC, we first need to introduce the
definition of computational indistinguishability.
Definition 2.1 (Cramer et al. (2015)) Let X[κ] =
{X1, · · · ,Xκ} and Y[κ] = {Y1, · · · ,Yκ} be two distri-
bution ensembles, where for each ` ∈ {1, · · · , κ}, X`
and Y` are random variables with range R`. We say
that X[κ] and Y[κ] are computationally indistinguishable,
denoted X
c≡Y , if for every non-uniform probabilistic
polynomial-time distinguisher D, every positive polyno-
mial p : N → R>0, and every sufficiently large κ ∈ N,
the following holds:
|Pr[D(µ) = 1]− Pr[D(ν) = 1]| < 1/p(κ)
where µ and ν are random samples drawn from X[κ] and
Y[κ], respectively.
The following privacy notion for SMC is standard in the
literature.
Definition 2.2 (Cramer et al. (2015)) Let Π be an
algorithm for computing h. We say that Π securely com-
putes h if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time al-
gorithm S such that for each party i ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and
every possible y, it holds that S(i, yi, hi(y))
c≡VIEWΠi (y),
where S(·) denotes the overall messages that can be seen
after the execution of S.
Definition 2.2 states that whatever a party receives dur-
ing the computing process can be constructed only via its
own inputs and the outputs of the functions to compute.
In other words, the computing process reveals nothing
more than what a party has to learn.
Encryption privacy. In this paper, we use homomorphic
encryption to tackle the issue of SMC for the agents. This
technique requires some computing entity, which could
be semi-honest, to perform function evaluations over en-
crypted data. In this paper, the system operator is used
as the computing entity. Roughly speaking, the agents
encrypt their private data and send the encrypted data
to the system operator. The system operator evaluates
the agents’ functions Φi’s over the received encrypted
data and sends the results to the agents. The agents then
decrypt the results to obtain the true values of Φi’s.
On the one hand, the above homomorphic encryption
setting could tackle the SMC issue as the agents only
receive aggregate function outputs, but do not receive
any form of individual private data. On the other hand,
since the system operator could be semi-honest, we need
to ensure encryption privacy against the system opera-
tor, that is, the system operator cannot infer the private
data of the agents from the encrypted data it receives. In
the homomorphic encryption literature Yi et al. (2014),
Paar and Pelzl (2010), Stallings (2011), two different no-
tions have been widely used to claim or define encryp-
tion privacy against the computing entity: (i) plaintexts
not efficiently solvable Rivest et al. (1978) and (ii) plain-
texts not efficiently distinguishable Goldwasser and Mi-
cali (1982). This paper adopts both the two notions, il-
lustrated next.
(i) Plaintexts not efficiently solvable. By this notion,
an encryption scheme is secure if the adversaries can-
not solve plaintexts via observing ciphertexts by any
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polynomial-time algorithms. For an encryption scheme
that adopts this privacy notion, breaking the scheme
(i.e., solving plaintexts) is or is believed to be computa-
tionally hard. However, in many cases, it is not proved
that the leveraged hard problem itself indeed does not
admit a polynomial-time solving algorithm, but rather
people have not found one yet. Hence, for this privacy
notion, the security level of an encryption scheme is usu-
ally not established by a proof, but claimed in a heuris-
tic manner by checking all existing solving algorithms
and claiming that none of them is efficient (usually given
that the key length is large enough). Well-known en-
cryption schemes that adopt this notion of security and
claim their security in this heuristic manner include pub-
lic key encryption scheme RSA and private key encryp-
tion schemes DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard).
(ii) Plaintexts not efficiently distinguishable. Roughly
speaking, an encryption scheme is secure in this sense
if the adversaries cannot distinguish between any plain-
texts via observing ciphertexts by any polynomial-time
algorithms. For the term indistinguishability, informally,
it means that given an encryption of a message randomly
chosen from any two-element message space determined
by the adversary, the adversary cannot identify the mes-
sage choice with probability significantly better than 0.5.
It is clear that this privacy notion is stronger than the
above one, since indistinguishability surely implies un-
solvability, but the reverse direction may not be true (it
could be hard to find which is the plaintext but easy to
tell which is not). A standard definition for this privacy
notion is semantic security, defined next.
Definition 2.3 (Cramer et al. (2015)) Let E be an
encryption scheme which outputs ciphertext E(x) on
plaintext x. An adversary chooses any plaintexts x, x′
and asks for their ciphertexts from the scheme holder.
The scheme holder outputs ciphertexts E(x) and E(x′)
and sends them to the adversary without telling the ad-
versary which ciphertext corresponds to which plaintext.
We say that E is semantically secure if for any plain-
texts x, x′ chosen by the adversary in the above setting,
it holds that E(x)
c≡E(x′) to the adversary.
Definition 2.3 renders semantically secure encryption
schemes provable. Usually, the semantic security of an
encryption scheme is established upon an assumption
that certain problem is hard to solve, and then the proof
of semantic security is performed by reducing the dis-
tinguish task to solving the concerned hard problem.
Well-known semantically secure encryption schemes in-
clude public key encryption schemes Goldwasser-Micali,
ElGamal, Paillier and Boneh-Goh-Nissim.
• Privacy notions for IOI. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no dominating definition for the question of IOI
in cryptography community. In this paper, we adopt the
following definition to quantify the uncertainty an adver-
sary has about the private inputs of other parties given
the outputs of the functions. The definition is inspired
by the notion of observability in control theory and is
consistent with the uncertainty based privacy notions
in the field of database analysis Marks (1996), Brodsky
et al. (2000).
Definition 2.4 Denote the true valuation of yi by y¯i
for each party i and denote y¯ = [y¯i]. For each party
i, for each j 6= i, denote ∆ij(y¯) = {yj ∈ Rdj : ∃y` ∈
Rd` for all ` 6= i, j s.t. hi(y¯i, yj , [y`]` 6=i,j) = hi(y¯)}, and
denote Distij(y¯) = supyj ,y′j∈∆ij(y¯) ‖yj − y′j‖2. Given y¯,
for each j ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, the amount of uncertainty
in yj in the input-output inference of h is defined as
mini6=j Distij(y¯). We say that the function h resists
input-output inference with unbounded uncertainty if
the amount of uncertainty in yj is infinite for all
j ∈ {1, · · · ,M} and for any y¯ ∈ Rd.
In the subsequent sections, we first study the question
of SMC in Sections 3 and 4. After that, we analyze the
question of IOI in Section 5.
2.4 Transformation between integers and real numbers
In distributed optimization problems, the variables and
coefficients are usually real numbers. However, most ex-
isting homomorphic encryption schemes rely on certain
modular operations and only work for integers. There-
fore, we need a mechanism for transformation between
real numbers and integers. Throughout the paper, the
accuracy level is set by a parameter σ ∈ N, which means
that for any real number, σ decimal fraction digits are
kept while the remaining decimal fraction digits are
dropped. We assume that the value of σ is known to the
system operator and all the agents. For a real number
r with σ decimal fraction digits, it is transformed into
an integer zr simply by zr = 10
σr. The following func-
tion is needed to transform a non-negative integer into
a signed real number. Given σ ∈ N and an odd posi-
tive integer w, an integer z ∈ Zw is transformed into
a signed real number with σ decimal fraction digits by
the following function parameterized by σ and w:
Tσ,w(z) =
{
z/10σ, if 0 ≤ z ≤ (w − 1)/2,
(z − w)/10σ, if (w + 1)/2 ≤ z < w.
(2)
The following property holds for the T function (2) and
is crucial to guarantee correctness of computations over
signed real numbers.
Lemma 2.1 Given an odd positive integer w, for any
r ∈ R with σ decimal fraction digits such that |10σr| ≤
(w − 1)/2, it holds that Tσ,w(10σr mod w) = r.
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PROOF. Since |10σr| ≤ (w − 1)/2, it is either 0 ≤
10σr ≤ (w − 1)/2 or −(w − 1)/2 ≤ 10σr < 0.
Case I: 0 ≤ 10σr ≤ (w − 1)/2. For this case, we have
10σr mod w = 10σr. Hence, by (2), we have Tσ,w(10
σr
mod w) = Tσ,w(10
σr) = (10σr)/10σ = r.
Case II: −(w − 1)/2 ≤ 10σr < 0. For this case, we have
10σr mod w = w+10σr. It is clear that (w+1)/2 ≤ w+
10σr < w. Hence, by (2), we have Tσ,w(10
σr mod w) =
Tσ,w(w + 10
σr) = (w + 10σr − w)/10σ = r.
3 Private key secure computation algorithm
In this section, we propose a secure computation algo-
rithm for (1) which is based on a private key fully ho-
momorphic encryption scheme.
3.1 Preliminaries
First, each participant i ∈ V ∪ {SO} constructs a set
C˜iΦ of coefficients such that (C˜
1
Φ, · · · , C˜NΦ , C˜SOΦ ) have the
following properties: (i) C˜SOΦ = C
SO
Φ ; (ii) C˜
i
Φ ⊆ CiΦ for
all i ∈ V; (iii) the sets C˜iΦ’s form a partition of CΦ, i.e.,⋃
i∈V∪{SO} C˜
i
Φ = CΦ and C˜
i
Φ ∩ C˜jΦ = ∅ for any i, j ∈ V ∪
{SO} and i 6= j. Such a construction can be realized by a
number of ways, e.g., assigning each shared coefficient to
the participant with the lowest identity index (assuming
that the system operator has identity index 0). Notice
that the mutual exclusiveness property above (i.e., C˜iΦ∩
C˜jΦ = ∅ for any i 6= j) is not possessed by the sets CiΦ’s.
This property can guarantee that each coefficient is only
encrypted once in the secure computation algorithm (see
line 3 of Algorithm 1). This is needed as the privacy
of a coefficient could be compromised if it is encrypted
multiple times (see the next subsection). For each i ∈
V ∪ {SO}, let mi = |C˜iΦ| and denote by ci = [ci`] ∈ Rmi
the vector of the elements of C˜iΦ. Let c = [ci]i∈V∪{SO} ∈
Rm with m =
∑
i∈V∪SOmi and let cV = [ci]i∈V .
For each Φi`, we view it as a function of both x and c.
Denote by Φsi` : Rn × Rm → R the function with the
same structure of Φi` but takes the coefficients c also
as variables and denote by y = [yi] ∈ Rm the variables
corresponding to c, where for each i ∈ V ∪ SO, yi ∈ Rmi
is the variable corresponding to ci. The relation between
Φi` and Φ
s
i` is then Φi`(x) = Φ
s
i`(x, y)|y=c.
For each Φsi`, assume that it is written in the canoni-
cal form, i.e., sum of monomials, and denote by κi` the
number of monomials of Φsi` and Q
v
i` : Rn × Rm → R
the v-th monomial of Φsi`. Then, Φ
s
i` can be written as
Φsi`(x, y) =
∑κi`
v=1Q
v
i`(x, y).
3.2 An illustrative example
We first use an illustrative example to demonstrate the
major challenges in the algorithm design. Consider the
scenario of two agents and a system operator. Each agent
i ∈ {1, 2} has a scalar state xi ∈ R. The joint functions of
the two agents are Φ1(x1, x2) = c1x
2
1+c2x1x2+c3x1 and
Φ2(x1, x2) = c1c2x2, respectively, where c1, c2, c3 ∈ R
are the private coefficients of agent 1 and c2 ∈ R is the
private coefficient of agent 2.
We next illustrate why existing homomorphic encryp-
tion schemes cannot be directly used to solve the above
problem and clarify how the challenges are addressed.
(i) Transformation between real numbers and integers.
Existing homomorphic encryption schemes only work
for binary numbers or non-negative integers and hence
cannot be directly applied to the above problem, where
the coefficients (c1, c2, c3) and the states (x1, x2) are
all signed real numbers. We overcome this challenge by
proposing the transformation mechanism (2) between
integers and real numbers. Roughly speaking, before en-
crypting a real data item, say c1, with σ decimal frac-
tion digits, one first transforms it into an integer 10σc1.
One can then apply a specific homomorphic encryption
scheme, which will be discussed in the next paragraphs,
to perform encryption, computation and decryption op-
erations over the transformed integers. After that, the
decrypted integer result is transformed back to a signed
real number by the transformation mechanism (2).
(ii) Sum operation over transformed integers. As men-
tioned in the last paragraph, before encrypting a real
data item, say c1, with σ decimal fraction digits, one
first transforms it into an integer 10σc1. This essen-
tially scales the magnitude of c1 by 10
σ times. Now
let agent 1 form the monomials using the transformed
integers (10σx1, 10
σc1, 10
σc2, 10
σc3). Since Q
1
1 and Q
2
1
have degree 3, they are scaled by 103σ times, i.e.,
Q11(10
σx, 10σc) = 10σc1 · (10σx1)2 = 103σc1x21 and
Q21(10
σx, 10σc) = 10σc2 · 10σx1 · 10σx2 = 103σc2x1x2.
Since Q31 has degree 2, it is scaled by 10
2σ times, i.e.,
Q31(10
σx, 10σc) = 10σc3 · 10σx1 = 102σc3x1. Hence,
with the transformed integers, the monomials Q11, Q
2
1
and Q31 are scaled by different times and thus the sum
operation between them cannot be directly applied. We
overcome this challenge by multiplying each monomial
Q`i formed with the transformed integers by a scaling
term 10(deg(Φ
s
i )−deg(Q`i))σ. In particular, the scaled Q11,
Q21 and Q
3
1 become Qˆ
1
1 = 10
(3−3)σ103σc1x21 = 10
3σc1x
2
1,
Qˆ21 = 10
(3−3)σ103σc2x1x2 = 103σc2x1x2 and Qˆ31 =
10(3−2)σ102σc3x1 = 103σc3x1, respectively. Notice that
the scaled monomials (Qˆ11, Qˆ
2
1, Qˆ
3
1) remain integers and
simultaneously they are all scaled by 103σ times and
hence the sum operation between them can be applied.
The above method is generalized in line 6 of Algorithm
1.
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(iii) Encryption of coefficients held by multiple agents.
In the above example, c2 is a private coefficient of both
agent 1 and agent 2. A question is whether the secu-
rity of c2 could be compromised when it is encrypted by
both agent 1 and agent 2. To answer this question, we
first need to choose a homomorphic encryption scheme.
The above example includes both addition and multipli-
cation operations. Hence, we need to use a fully homo-
morphic encryption scheme. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there does not exist a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme for integers which is both efficiently imple-
mentable and semantically secure. Please refer to Section
9.1 for a summary of existing homomorphic encryption
schemes. In this section, we choose the SingleMod en-
cryption Phatak et al. (2014) as our designing prototype,
because it is an efficiently implementable (private key)
fully homomorphic encryption scheme (for integers). On
the other hand, the SingleMod encryption is not seman-
tically secure. Instead, its security level adopts the stan-
dard notion of Plaintexts not efficiently solvable (see Sec-
tion 2.3). As mentioned in Section 2.3, many widely used
encryption schemes adopt this notion of security, e.g.,
RSA, DES and AES. Since the SingleMod encryption is
not semantically secure, the security of c2 could be com-
promised if it is encrypted by both agent 1 and agent 2.
For the SingleMod encryption, agent 1 and agent 2 agree
on a large positive integer key w and keep it secret from
the system operator. To encrypt a non-negative integer
t < w, one chooses an arbitrary positive integer ut and
encrypts t by tˆ = utw+ t. Now assume that agent 1 and
agent 2 encrypt 10σc2 (recall that 10
σc2 is an integer) by
yˆ′2 = u
′
y2w+ 10
σc2 and yˆ
′′
2 = u
′′
y2w+ 10
σc2, respectively,
where u′y2 (resp. u
′′
y2) is an arbitrary positive integer only
known to agent 1 (resp. 2). By knowing yˆ′2 and yˆ
′′
2 , the
system operator can compute yˆ′2 − yˆ′′2 = (u′y2 − u′′y2)w.
Notice that u′y2 , u
′′
y2 , yˆ
′
2, yˆ
′′
2 and w are all integers. The
system operator can then tell that w must be a factor
of yˆ′2 − yˆ′′2 . In the worst case where u′y2 − u′′y2 and w are
both prime numbers, there are only two possible values
for w. Assume |10σc2| ≤ (w−1)/2 (which is usually true
as w needs to be chosen very large for the concern of
security). By Lemma 2.1, for each possible w, since the
system operator knows the values of σ and yˆ′2, it can ob-
tain a unique value of c2 by computing c2 = Tσ,w(10
σc2
mod w) = Tσ,w(yˆ
′
2 mod w). By Definition 2.3, this indi-
cates that the SingleMod encryption is not semantically
secure. By the above procedure, the system operator can
obtain a good estimate of c2. We overcome this challenge
by constructing a partition of the coefficient set CΦ as il-
lustrated in Section 3.1 so that it is guaranteed that each
private coefficient is only encrypted once. For this exam-
ple, the partition could be either C˜1Φ = {c1, c2, c3} and
C˜2Φ = ∅ in which agent 1 encrypts c2, or C˜1Φ = {c1, c3}
and C˜2Φ = {c2} in which agent 2 encrypts c2.
(iv) Causal attacks by the system operator. Assume that
the system operator can use the data received up to time
instant k to infer x(k). Again, due to that the Single-
Mod encryption is not semantically secure, the system
operator could succeed if it fully knows the update rule
of x(k). We now assume that c1 and c2 are private coef-
ficients of the system operator, X2 = R, γ(1) = 1, and
these are known to the system operator. By (1), the sys-
tem operator can derive x2(2) = (1 − c1c2)x2(1). Now
agent 2 encrypts x2(1) and x2(2) by xˆ2(1) = ux2(1)w +
10σx2(1) and xˆ2(2) = ux2(2)w+ 10
σx2(2), respectively.
By knowing x2(2) = (1− c1c2)x2(1), the system opera-
tor can obtain xˆ2(2)− (1− c1c2)xˆ2(1) = (ux2(2)− (1−
c1c2)ux2(1))w and know that w is a factor of xˆ2(2)−(1−
c1c2)xˆ2(1). Similar to the discussion in (iii), by knowing
σ, xˆ2(1) and xˆ2(2), the system operator can then obtain
a good estimate of x2(1) and x2(2). We overcome this
challenge by assuming that the system operator can only
launch temporarily independent attacks. Please refer to
Assumption 3.2. This assumption has been widely used
in database privacy. Please refer to Remark 3.2 for the
detailed discussion of this assumption.
3.3 Algorithm design and analysis
The private key secure computation algorithm for (1) is
presented by Algorithm 1. This algorithm is based on the
SingleMod encryption Dijk et al. (2010), Phatak et al.
(2014). As mentioned in item (iii) of Section 3.2, the Sin-
gleMod encryption is an efficiently implementable pri-
vate key fully homomorphic encryption scheme for inte-
gers. The encryption privacy of our encryption scheme
shares the same privacy notion with that of the Single-
Mod encryption, i.e., Plaintexts not efficiently solvable
(see Section 2.3). In particular, for our case, breaking
the scheme is as hard as the approximate greatest com-
mon divisor (GCD) problem 1 , which is widely believed
to be NP-hard Dijk et al. (2010), Phatak et al. (2014).
The algorithm is informally stated next. At line 2, all
the agents agree on a key w and keep the value of w
unknown to the system operator. One case where such
key agreement is possible is that the sub-communication
graph between the agents is connected and all its com-
munication links are secure 2 .
For the sake of security, w is chosen as a very large num-
ber, e.g., in the magnitude of 22000 Giry (2017). On the
other hand, to guarantee the correctness of decryption
(line 7) which is a modulo operation over w, the value of
w cannot be too small. Roughly speaking, the value of w
must be larger than all possible plaintexts of computing
results. This is captured by the following assumption.
1 Approximate GCD: Given polynomially many integers
randomly chosen close to multiples of a large integer p, i.e.,
in the form of ai = pqi + ri, where p, qi’s and ri’s are all
integers, find the “common near divisor” p.
2 A communication link between i and j is secure if only
i and j can access the messages sent via this link while no
others can access the messages.
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Algorithm 1 Private key secure computation algorithm
1. Initialization: Each agent i chooses any xi(0) ∈ Xi;
2. Key agreement: All agents agree on a large odd positive
integer w and keep w secret from SO;
3. Coefficient encryption: Each agent i chooses any uyi ∈
Zmi>0 and sends to SO yˆi computed as yˆi = uyiw+ 10
σci; SO
forms yˆ = [yˆj ]j∈V∪{SO} with yˆSO = 10
σcSO;
4. while k ≥ 0
5. State encryption: Each agent i chooses any uxi(k) ∈
Zni>0 and sends to SO xˆi(k) computed as xˆi(k) = uxi(k)w +
10σxi(k); SO forms xˆ(k) = [xˆj(k)]j∈V ;
6. Computation over ciphertexts: For each i ∈ V, for
each ` = 1, · · · , ni, SO sends Φ¯si`(k) to agent i computed as:
Φ¯si`(k) =
∑κi`
v=1
[10(deg(Φ
s
i`)−deg(Qvi`))σQvi`(xˆ(k), yˆ)];
7. Decryption: For each i ∈ V, for each ` = 1, · · · , ni,
agent i computes Φˆsi`(k) = Tdeg(Φsi`)σ,w(Φ¯
s
i`(k) mod w);
8. Local update: Each agent i forms Φˆsi (k) = [Φˆ
s
i`(k)]
and computes xi(k + 1) = PXi [xi(k)− γ(k)Φˆsi (k)];
9. Set k ← k + 1;
10. end while
Assumption 3.1 The key w is chosen large enough
such that, for any step k, it holds that w ≥ 1 +
2 maxi,` 10
deg(Φsi`)σ|Φi`(x(k))|.
Remark 3.1 A sufficient condition for Assumption 3.1
is that x lives in a compact set whose bound is known
to the agents a priori. In the cases where this sufficient
condition does not hold, since w needs to be chosen very
large for the sake of security, Assumption 3.1 is usually
automatically satisfied. In Section 6, we provide concrete
examples for which this is true.
At line 3, each agent i encrypts its coefficient ci via the
SingleMod encryption using the private key w and a
random integer vector uyi . Recall that any involved real
number has (at most) σ decimal fraction digits. Hence,
10σci is an integer vector. Since ci is fixed throughout
the computing process, it only has to be encrypted once.
At line 5, each agent i encrypts its current state xi(k) via
the SingleMod encryption using the key w and a random
integer vector uxi(k). Notice that at each iteration, the
encryption of xi(k) adopts a new randomness uxi(k).
Line 6 is the computation step at which the system
operator computes each function Φsi` by the encrypted
data (xˆ(k), yˆ). For each v = 1, · · · , κi`, Qvi`(xˆ(k), yˆ)
is multiplied by 10(deg(Φ
s
i`)−deg(Qvi`))σ in order to have
each monomial scaled by the same times so that the
sum operation can be performed. In particular, with-
out the uxi(k)w (resp. uyiw) part (which is eliminated
by modulo operation in the decryption step), each
xi(k) (resp. ci) is scaled by 10
σ times in the inte-
ger transformation operation at line 5 (resp. 3). Each
Qvi`(xˆ(k), yˆ) is then scaled by 10
deg(Qvi`)σ times and
10(deg(Φ
s
i`)−deg(Qvi`))σQvi`(xˆ(k), yˆ) is scaled by 10
deg(Φsi`)σ
times. Thus, all the monomials of Φsi` are scaled by the
same times and can be summed up.
Line 7 is the decryption step. Each agent i first per-
forms modulo operation over the encrypted function
value Φ¯si`(k) by the private key w which eliminates all
terms having w as a factor. Then, agent i transforms
the resulted integer back into a signed real number by
the T function defined by (2).
Line 8 is the local update step. Each agent i updates
xi(k) by (1) by using Φˆ
s
i (k) as Φi(x(k)).
To help with understanding, we provide a numerical ex-
ample in Section 9.3.1 to go through the steps of Algo-
rithm 1.
Assumption 3.2 The system operator can only per-
form temporarily independent attacks, i.e., at each step
k, it uses the data received at step k to infer x(k), but
does not use past data to collectively infer the sequence
x(0), · · · , x(k).
Remark 3.2 One case where Assumption 3.2 holds is
that the system operator is not fully aware of the update
rule of x(k) and views the sequence {x(k)} as a temporally
independent time series Shi et al. (2011). For example,
the system operator could be an untrustworthy third party
who does not know the underlying update rule (1) or even
does not know what problem the agents aim to solve Roy
et al. (2012). In this scenario, the system operator only
receives a sequence of (encrypted) aggregate results from
an unknown system. This scenario has been widely con-
sidered in database privacy and many works in the field
are based on the temporal independence assumption. For
example, the work Bhaskar et al. (2011), which studied
noiseless database privacy, explicitly made the assump-
tion that the entries in the database are uncorrelated and
justified the assumption by that, without knowing a sys-
tem, observing aggregate information released from the
system may provide little knowledge on the correlation
of the entries. Moreover, as pointed out by Dwork et al.
(2005) and Chapter 14 of Zhu et al. (2017), most existing
differential privacy works assume that the dataset con-
sists of independent records, despite the fact that records
in real world applications are often correlated.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1
and 3.2 hold. By Algorithm 1, the following claims hold:
1) Correctness: Φˆsi (k) = Φi(x(k)) for any k and i ∈ V.
2) Security: Between the agents, Algorithm 1 securely
computes the sequence of {Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))}; for
the system operator, at each step k, Algorithm 1 is as
hard as the approximate GCD problem for the system
operator to solve x(k) and cV .
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The proof of Theorem 3.1 is given in Section 7.1. In
the proof, the privacy notion of plaintexts not efficiently
solvable (Section 2.3) and Definition 2.2 are used. In
particular, the correctness is derived by exploring the
homomorphic property of the proposed private key en-
cryption scheme and the property of the proposed real-
integer transformation scheme (Lemma 2.1). The secure
computation result between the agents is obtained by
using the simulation paradigm which is a standard tech-
nique for proving SMC Cramer et al. (2015), Lindell and
Pinkas (2009). The security level against the system op-
erator is based on the fact that solving x(k) and cV is
exactly the approximate GCD problem.
Remark 3.3 The encryption scheme of Algorithm 1
leverages the SingleMod encryption. As pointed out in
Phatak et al. (2014), the SingleMod encryption is not
semantically secure. Instead, the encryption privacy of
the SingleMod encryption is claimed in the sense of
Plaintexts not efficiently solvable. On the one hand, this
privacy notion is weaker than semantic security Yi et al.
(2014). On the other hand, the weaker security level
renders that Algorithm 1 is fully homomorphic and ef-
ficiently implementable (see Section 6.1 for efficiency).
As mentioned in Section 2.3, this sense of privacy
claim has been adopted in many widely used encryption
schemes, e.g., RSA, DES and AES. In the next section,
we assume that the joint functions are affine and pro-
vide a partially homomorphic encryption scheme which
possesses semantic security.
4 Public key secure computation algorithm
Algorithm 1 proposed in the last section has several lim-
itations: key distribution problem exists as the agents
have to agree on a private key; its security level against
the system operator is not semantic security, and as a
consequence, it can only resist temporarily independent
attacks against the system operator. In this section, we
consider the special case where Φi`’s are affine functions
and propose a public key secure computation algorithm
to address these limitations. To be more specific, the
class of computation problems considered in this section
is specified by the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1 For each i ∈ V and each ` ∈
{1, · · · , ni}, the function Φi` is affine in x and the coef-
ficients of Φi` are all known to the system operator.
Remark 4.1 Assumption 4.1 indicates that each agent
i’s coefficients are known to the system operator but may
not be known to other agents.
The reason that Assumption 4.1 is needed for this section
is that the Paillier encryption scheme adopted in this sec-
tion is only additively homomorphic but not multiplica-
tively homomorphic. Thus, we need the desired functions
Φi`’s to be affine in x. Moreover, if the function to be
computed is a weighted sum of x, then the weights (trans-
formed into integers) must be known by the entity who
performs the computation (the system operator in our
algorithm) so that the multiplication of a weight and a
variable can be carried out by summing up the variable
with itself for certain times (see (3-ii) of Theorem 9.1).
A similar treatment as Assumption 4.1 was adopted in
Freris and Patrinos (2016) in the context of encrypted
average consensus.
To the best of our knowledge, all computationally efficient
public key homomorphic encryption schemes are partially
homomorphic, e.g., the RSA scheme Rivest et al. (1978)
and the ElGamal scheme ElGamal (1985) are multiplica-
tively homomorphic, and the Goldwasser–Micali scheme
Goldwasser and Micali (1982) and the Paillier scheme
Paillier (1999) are additively homomorphic. The first
fully public key homomorphic encryption scheme was de-
veloped by Gentry in his seminal work Gentry (2009).
However, due to that the Gentry fully homomorphic en-
cryption scheme uses lattice and bootstrapping, its im-
plementation is rather complicated and time-consuming,
which significantly limits its applications in practice.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, Φi is the first-order gradient
of certain functions with respect to xi. A sufficient and
necessary condition for the affinity assumption is that the
associated component functions are affine or quadratic in
xi. Hence, problem (1) satisfying Assumption 4.1 covers
a large class of problems, e.g., linear and quadratic pro-
grams Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1997), quadratic convex
games Zhu and Frazzoli (2016) and affine variational in-
equalities Facchinei and Pang (2003).
By Assumption 4.1, each function Φi` is a weighted sum
of x for which the weights are known to the system oper-
ator. For convenience of notation, we write each Φi` as:
Φi`(x) =
∑N
j=1
∑nj
v=1
Ajvi` xjv +Bi` (3)
where Ajvi` ∈ R and Bi` ∈ R are coefficients known
to the system operator. For each j ∈ V, let Aji` =
[Aj1i` , · · · , Ajnji` ] and Aji = [Aji`]`∈{1,··· ,ni}. For each
i ∈ V, let Ai` = [A1i`, · · · , ANi` ] for each ` = 1, · · · , ni,
Ai = [A
1
i , · · · , ANi ] and Bi = [Bi1, · · · , Bini ]T . Let
A = [Ai]i∈V and B = [Bi]i∈V . By these notations, we
have Φi`(x) =
∑N
j=1A
j
i`xj + Bi` = Ai`x + Bi` and
Φi(x) =
∑N
j=1A
j
ixj +Bi = Aix+Bi.
In this section, we use the Paillier encryption scheme
as our design prototype. This is because the Paillier en-
cryption scheme is an efficiently implementable (pub-
lic key) additively homomorphic encryption scheme (for
integers). Again, we use the proposed transformation
mechanism (2) to overcome the challenge of signed real
numbers. The other challenges illustrated in Section 3.2
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do not exist for this case. Since the monomials Ajvi` xjv’s
have the same degree, challenge (ii) in Section 3.2 does
not exist. Since we assume that the coefficientsAjvi` ’s and
Bi`’s are all known to the system operator, the agents
do not have to encrypt any coefficient and hence chal-
lenge (iii) in Section 3.2 does not exist. Since the Paillier
encryption scheme is semantically secure, challenge (iv)
in Section 3.2 does not exist. Informally speaking, this
is because even if the system operator fully knows the
relation between some xi(k) and xi(k+1), by Definition
2.3, the encryptions of xi(k) and xi(k + 1) provide zero
knowledge to the system operator.
4.1 Algorithm design and analysis
The algorithm developed in this section is based on a
public key partially homomorphic encryption scheme,
namely, the Paillier encryption scheme Paillier (1999).
The preliminaries for the Paillier encryption scheme are
provided in Section 9.2.
Algorithm 2 Public key secure computation algorithm
1. Initialization: Each agent i chooses any xi(0) ∈ Xi;
2. Key generation: Each agent i generates Paillier keys
(αi, βi, νi, pii), publicizes (αi, βi) while keeps (νi, pii) private;
3. while k ≥ 0
4. State encryption: For each i ∈ V and ` ∈ {1, · · · , ni},
for each j ∈ V, agent i selects any rji`(k) ∈ Z∗αj and sends to
SO xˆji`(k) = β
10σxi`(k) mod αj
j · rji`(k)αj mod α2j ;
5. Computation over ciphertexts: For each i ∈ V and
` ∈ {1, · · · , ni}, SO sends Φ¯si`(k) to agent i computed as:
Φ¯si`(k) =(β
102σBi` modαi
i
N∏
j=1
nj∏
v=1
xˆijv(k)
10σA
jv
i`
modαi) modα2i ;
6. Decryption: For each i ∈ V and ` ∈ {1, · · · , ni}, agent
i computes Φˆsi`(k) = T2σ,αi(
(Φ¯si`(k)
νi mod α2i )−1
αi
·pii mod αi);
7. Local update: Each agent i forms Φˆsi (k) = [Φˆ
s
i`(k)]
and computes xi(k + 1) = PXi [xi(k)− γ(k)Φˆsi (k)];
8. Set k ← k + 1;
9. end while
The public key secure computation algorithm for (1)
satisfying Assumption 4.1 is presented by Algorithm 2.
At line 2, each agent i generates its Paillier keys
(αi, βi, νi, pii), where (αi, βi) are public keys known
to all participants while (νi, pii) are private keys only
known to agent i. For the sake of security, the keys are
chosen very large, e.g., in the magnitude of 22000 Giry
(2017). To guarantee decryption correctness, we need
the following Assumption 4.2. Remark 3.1 applies to
this assumption.
Assumption 4.2 For each agent i, its public key αi is
chosen large enough such that, for any step k, it holds
that αi ≥ 1 + 2× 102σ‖Aix(k) +Bi‖max.
Line 4 is the encryption step. Each agent i encrypts xi(k)
by the Paillier encryption operation N times such that
the j-th encryption uses agent j’s public keys (αj , βj)
and the corresponding encrypted data xˆji (k) is used for
the computation of agent j’s desired functions Φj(x(k)).
By receiving xˆji`(k) and only knowing agent j’s public
keys (αj , βj), under the decisional composite residuosity
assumption (DCRA) 3 , it is computationally intractable
for the system operator to infer xi`(k).
Line 5 is the computation step. The computation per-
formed by the system operator is based on the addi-
tively homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption
scheme, i.e., roughly speaking, the multiplication of ci-
phertexts provides the encryption of the sum of the cor-
responding plaintexts (see Section 9.2).
Line 6 is the decryption step. Agent i decrypts each
Φ¯si`(k) by the Paillier decryption operation and trans-
forms the decrypted non-negative integer into a signed
real number by the T function defined by (2).
Line 7 is the local update step. Each agent i updates
xi(k) by (1) by using Φˆ
s
i (k) as Φi(x(k)).
To help with understanding, we provide a numerical ex-
ample in Section 9.3.2 to go through the steps of Algo-
rithm 2.
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 4.1, 4.2
and the standard cryptographic assumption DCRA hold.
By Algorithm 2, the following claims hold:
1) Correctness: Φˆsi (k) = Φi(x(k)) for any k and i ∈ V.
2) Security: Algorithm 2 securely computes the sequence
of {Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))} between the agents and is
semantically secure against the system operator.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is given in Section 7.2. In the
proof, Definitions 2.3 and 2.2 are used. In particular, the
correctness is derived by the homomorphic properties of
the Paillier encryption scheme (part (3) of Theorem 9.1)
and the property of the proposed real-integer transfor-
mation scheme (Lemma 2.1). The secure computation
result between agents is obtained by using the simula-
tion paradigm. The semantic security against the sys-
tem operator follows the semantic security of the Paillier
encryption scheme (combination of part (2) of Theorem
9.1 and Theorem 5.2.10 of Goldreich (2004)).
5 Privacy analysis on input-output inference
In the last two sections, we provide two algorithms to
achieve SMC. However, as pointed out in Section 2.2,
3 The statement of the DCRA is given in Section 9.2.
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it is possible that the adversary could infer the private
inputs of the securely computed functions purely from its
own inputs and the function outputs. In this section, we
study the second problem raised in Section 2.2, that is,
whether the private inputs of a function can be uniquely
determined from its outputs.
Recall that Φsi denotes the function with the same struc-
ture of Φi but takes the coefficients c also as variables (see
Section 3.1). Denote by ({x¯(k)}, X¯, c¯) the true values of
({x(k)}, X, c). For each i ∈ V, agent i aims to find fea-
sible ({xˆ−i(k)}, Xˆ−i, cˆ−i) that satisfy its observations:
Φsi (x¯i(k), xˆ−i(k), c¯i, cˆ−i) = Φi(x¯(k)) for all k ∈ N, and
xˆj(k + 1) = PXˆj [xˆj(k) − γ(k)Φsj(x¯i(k), xˆ−i(k), c¯i, cˆ−i)]
for all j ∈ V\{i} and all k ∈ N. By Definition 2.4, the se-
quence of functions {Φ(x(k))} resists input-output infer-
ence with unbounded uncertainty if, for any agent i ∈ V,
each element of the feasible set {{xˆ−i(k)}, Xˆ−i, cˆ−i} has
unbounded uncertainty.
In this section, we study the scenario where Φi`’s are
a class of quadratic functions specified by the following
assumption.
Assumption 5.1 For each i ∈ V and each ` =
1, · · · , ni, Φi`(x) = xTHi`x + Ai`x + Bi`, where
Hi` ∈ Rn×n and Ai` ∈ R1×n are public constant matrix
and vector, respectively, that are known to all the agents,
while Bi` ∈ R is a private constant scalar only known to
a subset of agents.
5.1 An illustrative example
We first use an illustrative example to show the issue
of input-output inference. Consider the case of three
agents in which agent 1 is adversary and agent 2 and
agent 3 are benign. Each agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} has a scalar
state xi ∈ R. The joint functions of the three agents are
Φ1(x1, x2, x3) = −x2 − x3, Φ2(x1, x2, x3) = −2x3 and
Φ3(x1, x2, x3) = −x1, respectively. For ease of presenta-
tion, assume Xi = R for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and γ(k) = 1 for
all k ∈ N, and these are known to all the three agents.
By (1), we then have x1(k+ 1) = x1(k) +x2(k) +x3(k),
x2(k+1) = x2(k)+2x3(k) and x3(k+1) = x1(k)+x3(k).
We next show that by knowing x1(k), x1(k + 1) and
x1(k + 2), agent 1 can uniquely determine x2(k) and
x3(k). Agent 1 knows x1(k+ 1) = x1(k) +x2(k) +x3(k)
and x1(k + 2) = x1(k + 1) + x2(k + 1) + x3(k + 1). By
plugging the relations x2(k + 1) = x2(k) + 2x3(k) and
x3(k + 1) = x1(k) + x3(k) into x1(k + 2) = x1(k + 1) +
x2(k + 1) + x3(k + 1), agent 1 derives x2(k) + 3x3(k) =
x1(k+2)−x1(k+1)−x1(k). Together with the equation
x2(k) +x3(k) = x1(k+ 1)−x1(k), agent 1 can uniquely
derive x2(k) = − 12 (x1(k+ 2)− 4x1(k+ 1) + 2x1(k)) and
x3(k) =
1
2 (x1(k + 2)− 2x1(k + 1)).
The above issue arises because the process defined by
(1) is iterative so that an adversarial agent can use suc-
cessive observations to infer the private inputs of the
other agents. Existing approaches in the privacy litera-
ture, e.g., Clarkson et al. (2009), Mardziel et al. (2011),
Mardziel et al. (2012), are only applicable to problems
with constant private inputs, but inapplicable to the
problem concerned in our paper, in which the private
inputs are time series generated by a dynamic system.
Hence, the iterative nature of the process necessitates
new analysis approaches.
We next modify the above example as x1(k + 1) =
x1(k) + x2(k) + x3(k), x2(k + 1) = x1(k) + x3(k) and
x3(k + 1) = x1(k) + x2(k). Following the above proce-
dure, agent 1 can derive x1(k+1) = x1(k)+x2(k)+x3(k)
and x1(k+ 2) = x1(k+ 1) + 2x1(k) +x2(k) +x3(k). No-
tice that these two equations degenerate to one in terms
of the unknowns x2(k) and x3(k). Hence agent 1 cannot
determine the two unknowns x2(k) and x3(k) from only
one equation. Actually, one can check by mathematical
induction that, no matter how many observations agent
1 uses, the equations it derives all degenerate to the one
above and hence it cannot determine x2(k) and x3(k).
The two examples above indicate that the issue of input-
output inference depends on the structural properties of
the joint functions. We will identify a sufficient condi-
tion on the structural properties of the null space of the
weight matrices of the joint functions under which the
affine functions resist input-output inference. The for-
mal analysis is presented in the next subsection.
5.2 Analysis
The quadratic term is decomposed as xTHi`x =∑N
u,v=1 x
T
uH
uv
i` xv, where each H
uv
i` is a block sub-
matrix of Hi`. Denote H
v
i` = [H
uv
i` + (H
vu
i` )
T ]u∈V
for each v ∈ V. For each i ∈ V, denote H−ij` =
diag{H1j`, · · · , Hi−1j` , Hi+1j` , · · · , HNj`} for each j ∈ V
and ` = 1, · · · , nj . Denote H−i = [H−ij` ]j∈V,`∈{1,··· ,nj},
i.e., H−i is obtained by stacking the quadratic
weight matrices of x−i in all Φj`’s. For each i ∈
V, let Ωi = {(j, `) : agent i knows Bj`}, Ω′i =
{(j, `) : agent i does not know Bj`} and A−ij` =
[A1j`, · · · , Ai−1j` , Ai+1j` , · · · , ANj`] for each j ∈ V and
` = 1, · · · , nj . Then A−i = [A−ij` ](j,`)∈Ωi is the matrix
obtained by stacking the weight matrices of x−i in all
those Φj`’s such that the constant term Bj`’s are known
to agent i. For example, let N = 4, nj = 3 for all
j = 1, · · · , 4, Ω1 = {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 2)} and Ω′1 ={(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 1), (3, 3), (4, 1), (4, 3)}.
In this case, H−1j` = diag{H2j`, H3j`, H4j`}, A−1j` =
[A2j`, A
3
j`, A
4
j`] for all (j, `), H
−1 = [(H−111 )
T , (H−112 )
T ,
(H−113 )
T , · · · , (H−141 )T , (H−142 )T , (H−143 )T ]T and A−1 =
[(A−113 )
T , (A−121 )
T , (A−132 )
T , (A−142 )
T ]T .
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Assumption 5.2 For each i ∈ V, there exists a null
vector oi of [(H
−i)T , (A−i)T ]T such that each entry of oi
is nonzero.
Remark 5.1 If Ωi = ∅ for some i ∈ V, then A−i can
be removed from Assumption 5.2. For the affine case of
Section 4 where Φi`(x) = Ai`x+Bi`,H
−i can be removed
from Assumption 5.2. Thus, the result of this section
includes affine functions as a special case.
Theorem 5.1 Suppose Assumption 5.2 holds. The se-
quence of functions {Φ(x(0)), · · · ,Φ(x(K))} specified by
Assumption 5.1 resists input-output inference with un-
bounded uncertainty for any K ∈ N.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in Section 7.3. In the
proof, Definition 2.4 is used. Here we provide some intu-
itions behind the theorem. We fix an adversary agent i
and aim to construct ({x−i(k)}, X−i, [Bj`](j,`)∈Ω′
i
) that
satisfy the sequence of its observations. For each j ∈ V,
denote the true (Xj , Bj , {xj(k)}) by (X¯j , B¯j , {x¯j(k)}).
A feasible construction is: xˆj(k) = x¯j(k) + δj for each
j ∈ V and each step k, where δi = 0, and for each j 6= i,
δj ∈ Rnj is an arbitrary constant vector such that each
entry of each δj is nonzero and [(H
−i)T , (A−i)T ]T δ−i =
0, with δ−i = [δv]v 6=i; Xˆj = {xj + δj : xj ∈ X¯j} for
each j 6= i; Bˆj` = B¯j` − Aj`δ for each (j, `) ∈ Ω′i
with δ = [δv]v∈V . Assumption 5.2 guarantees the exis-
tence of the above set of δj ’s. Informally speaking, for
each (j, `) ∈ Ωi, the overall perturbation of δv’s is ab-
sorbed by the relation [(H−i)T , (A−i)T ]T δ−i = 0 and
the construction of Xˆj`; for each (j, `) ∈ Ω′i, the per-
turbation is absorbed by the constructions of Bˆj` and
Xˆj` and the relation H
−iδ−i = 0. It would be easy
to check that, for any nonzero real number r, since rδ
also satisfies the condition given in Assumption 5.2, i.e.,
[(H−i)T , (A−i)T ]T rδ−i = 0, the set of rδj ’s is also fea-
sible with the same Xˆj ’s and Bˆj ’s. Since each entry of
each δj is nonzero, each entry of each rδj is also nonzero
and could be arbitrarily large by choosing r arbitrarily
large. By this, we see that the above construction has an
infinite number of possibilities and the set of such con-
structions is unbounded. See Section 7.3 for the formal
proof of the above reasoning.
6 Case study
In this section, we validate the efficacy of Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 by a demand response problem and an
optimal power flow problem, respectively.
The simulation environment for both two case studies
is as follows. On the hardware side, the simulation is
performed on a Dell OptiPlex 9020 desktop computer
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU at 3.60 GHz. On
the software side, the simulation is performed on MAT-
LAB R2016a. The involved operations over big integers,
Table 1
Parameters/variables of the demand response problem
c disutility cost parameters
R reduced load
S maximum available power supply
L power load
fmax maximum line capacity
Hs generation shift factor matrix
Hl load shift factor matrix
including key generation, encryption, computation over
encrypted data and decryption, are all performed over
the type of java.math.BigInteger variables under the
integrated Java 1.7.0 60−b19 with Oracle Corporation
Java HotSpot(TM) 64-Bit Server VM mixed mode.
6.1 Algorithm 1
We simulate Algorithm 1 by a demand response problem.
6.1.1 Demand response problem
• Problem formulation. Consider a power network which
is modeled as an interconnected graph Gp = {Vp, Ep},
where each node i ∈ Vp represents a bus and each link
in Ep represents a line. Each bus is connected to either
a power supply or load and each load is associated with
an agent. The set of load buses is denoted by Vl ⊆ Vp
and the set of supply buses is denoted by Vs ⊆ Vp. In
a demand response problem, the agents could be house-
holds/customers and the system operator could be a
utility company that sells electricity to the customers Li
et al. (2011).
The physical meanings of the parameters and variables
of the demand response problem are listed in Table 1.
Denote by Si ∈ R≥0 the maximum available power sup-
ply at bus i ∈ Vs and by Li ∈ R≥0 the intended power
load at bus i ∈ Vl. Let S = [Si]i∈Vs and L = [Li]i∈Vl . If
1T|Vs|S ≥ 1T|Vl|L, then all the intended loads can be sat-
isfied. Otherwise, some customers have to reduce their
loads. For each i ∈ Vl, denote byRi ∈ [0, Li] the reduced
load of customer i and let R
∆
= [Ri]i∈Vl . Each customer
i aims to solve the the following optimization problem:
min
Ri∈[0,Li]
ciRi − Λi(Li −Ri) + Υ(1T|Vl|(L−R))(Li −Ri)
s.t. 1T|Vl|(L−R) ≤ 1T|Vs|S, HsS −Hl(L−R) ≤ fmax,
−HsS +Hl(L−R) ≤ fmax (4)
where ciRi represents the disutility induced by customer
i’s load reduction Ri with ci > 0; Λi : R≥0 → R is a
scalar function and Λi(Li −Ri) is the benefit produced
by customer i’s actual load Li−Ri; Υ : R≥0 → R≥0 and
Υ(1T|Vl|(L − R)) stands for the charged price given the
total actual load 1T|Vl|(L−R);Hs ∈ [−1, 1]|Ep|×|Vs| (resp.
Hl ∈ [−1, 1]|Ep|×|Vl|) is the generation (resp. load) shift
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factor matrix such that the (j, `)-th entry represents the
power distributed on line j when 1MW is injected into
(resp. withdrawn from) bus `; fmax = [fmaxj ]j∈Ep with
fmaxj ∈ R≥0 the maximum capacity of line j. For each
i ∈ Vl, denote the i-th column of Hl by Hl(i).
For each i ∈ Vl, we choose Λi(Li − Ri) = − 12ai(Li −
Ri)
2 + bi(Li−Ri) with ai > 0. For the pricing policy Υ,
we adopt (4) in Bulow and Peiderer (1983), i.e., Υ(y) =
λy
1
τ with λ > 0 and τ ∈ (0, 1). To make 1τ an integer,
we choose τ = 0.5.
• Derivation of update rule (1). By first introducing La-
grange multipliers to deal with the constraints of (4) and
then applying the projected gradient method (in both
primal and dual spaces), we can derive the update rule
in the form of problem (1) as follows:
Ri(k + 1) = P[0,Li][Ri(k)− γ(k)(ci − ai(Li −Ri(k))
+ bi − 2λ(1T|Vl|(L−R(k)))(Li −Ri(k))
− λ(1T|Vl|(L−R(k)))2 − µ0(k)
+ µT+(k)Hl(i)− µT−(k)Hl(i))], ∀i ∈ Vl
µ0(k + 1) = PR≥0 [µ0(k) + γ(k)(1
T
|Vl|(L−R(k))
− 1T|Vs|S)]
µ+(k + 1) = PR|Ep|≥0
[µ+(k) + γ(k)(HsS −Hl(L−R)
− fmax)]
µ−(k + 1) = PR|Ep|≥0
[µ−(k) + γ(k)(−HsS +Hl(L−R)
− fmax)]
where µ0 ∈ R≥0, µ+ ∈ R|Ep|≥0 and µ− ∈ R|Ep|≥0 are dual
variables associated with the first, second and third
constraint of (4), respectively. Notice that (µ0, µ+, µ−)
are global dual variables since the constraints of (4)
are shared by all the customers. We equally partition
(µ0, µ+, µ−) into |Vl| parts and each customer i holds
and updates one part of the overall dual states, denoted
by µi. Such a partition on the one hand reduces the
computational burden (caused by encryption and de-
cryption of the dual variables) of each customer, and on
the other hand reduces the amount of information that
can be accessed by each customer (since each customer
only holds one subset of the dual variable update rule
functions).
•Privacy issue. In the demand response problem (4), the
parameters (λ,Hs, Hl, S, f
max) are held by and private
to the utility company (the system operator). On the
other hand, each customer i holds its primal and dual
variables (Ri, µi) and coefficients (ai, bi, ci, Li), whose
values are private to customer i.
Table 2
Running time of Algorithm 1 on the demand response prob-
lem
Key length average time maximum time
(bit) /iter./customer (s) /iter./customer (s)
500 0.0097 0.0099
1000 0.0100 0.0102
2000 0.0101 0.0103
3000 0.0104 0.0105
4000 0.0110 0.0112
6.1.2 Simulation results
We use the IEEE 14-bus Test System Working group
(1973), shown by Fig. 2, as the demand response net-
work. There are two generators and eleven loads in the
system. The system parameters are adopted from MAT-
POWER Zimmerman et al. (2011). In the simulation,
we tested different lengths of keys and have checked that
Assumption 3.1 is satisfied for all the cases.
• Perfect correctness. We stack the collective primal and
dual variables (R,µ0, µ+, µ−) into a single column vec-
tor, denoted by η. To show the correctness of Algorithm
1, we first obtain a benchmark evolution sequence of
η by simulating the plain projected gradient method
without applying the homomorphic encryption mecha-
nism of Algorithm 1. The precision level is set as keep-
ing four decimal fraction digits during the whole pro-
cess. The derived benchmark sequence of η is denoted by
{ηplain(k)} and the state of the final iteration (iteration
30) is treated as the benchmark equilibrium, denoted by
η˜plain. We next simulate Algorithm 1 with the same ini-
tial states and precision level as those of the benchmark
simulation and the evolution sequence of η is denoted
by {ηprivcy(k)}. The trajectories of ‖ηprivcy(k)− η˜plain‖
and ‖ηprivcy(k)− ηplain(k)‖ are shown in Fig. 3. In Fig.
3, the trajectory of ‖ηprivcy(k)− η˜plain‖ (blue solid line)
shows the convergence behavior of {ηprivcy(k)} and the
trajectory of ‖ηprivcy(k) − ηplain(k)‖ (red dashed line),
which is constant at 0, shows that ηprivcy(k) is exactly
equal to ηplain(k) at all iterations which verifies the pre-
fect correctness of Algorithm 1.
• Computational efficiency. We simulate with different
key lengths to study the efficiency of the algorithm. The
running time is shown by Table 2. The first column is the
length of the private key w in bit and the second (resp.
third) column is the average (resp. maximum) time per
iteration per customer in second, which consists of a sin-
gle customer’s encryption, encrypted computation, de-
cryption, transformation between real numbers and in-
tegers and local update for a single iteration. Table 2
shows that the proposed private key secure computation
algorithm can be efficiently implemented.
6.2 Algorithm 2
We next simulate Algorithm 2 by an optimal power flow
(OPF) problem.
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Fig. 2. IEEE 14-bus Test System
Fig. 3. Trajectories of ‖ηprivcy(k) − η˜plain‖ and
‖ηprivcy(k)− ηplain(k)‖
6.2.1 Optimal power flow problem
• Problem formulation. Consider a power network com-
prising a set of agents V ∆= {1, · · · , N} and a system
operator. In an OPF setting, the agents could be power
generators who supply electric energy via reference buses
and the system operator could be an energy manager
responsible for power supply regulation. For each gener-
ator i, let Ni ⊆ V identify the set of neighbors to gener-
ator i. We adopt the OPF model from page 514 of Wood
and Wollenberg (1996) with the simplification that each
bus has only one generator and one load. The physical
meanings of the parameters and variables of the OPF
problem are listed in Table 3. The OPF problem is for-
mulated as follows:
minP∈[P,P ],θ∈RN
∑
i∈V (aiP
2
i + biPi)
s.t. Pi − Li = Diω˜ +
∑
j∈Ni
tij(θi − θj), ∀i ∈ V,
tij(θi − θj) ≤ P ij , ∀j ∈ Ni, ∀i ∈ V (5)
where ai > 0 for all i ∈ V, P = (Pi) ∈ RN , θ = (θi) ∈
RN , and ω˜ = 60Hz is the steady state of ω. In prob-
lem (5), the objective function measures the power losses
or the cost of supplied power. The equality constraints
represent the power balance between neighboring refer-
Table 3
Parameters/variables of the OPF problem
a, b cost parameters
ω angular frequency
θ phase angle
P mechanical power
P lower limit of mechanical power
P upper limit of mechanical power
L power load
P ij capacity of line connecting buses i and j
D load-damping constant
tij tie-line stiffness coefficient
ence buses. The inequality constraints depict the capac-
ity limit of a line connecting two neighboring buses.
Notice that each summand of the objective function of
(5), aiP
2
i + biPi, only depends on and is convex in gen-
erator i’s local state Pi and the constraints of problem
(5) are affine in (Pi, θi). Thus, problem (5) is separable
and equivalent to the distributed optimization problem
where, given (P−i, θ−i), each generator i aims to solve
the following optimization problem:
minPi∈[P i,P i],θi∈R aiP
2
i + biPi
s.t. P` − L` = D`ω˜ +
∑
j∈N`
t`j(θ` − θj), ∀` ∈ Ni ∪ {i},
tij(θi − θj) ≤ P ij , tji(θj − θi) ≤ P ji, ∀j ∈ Ni. (6)
• Derivation of update rule (1). Denote by λ` for ` ∈
Ni ∪ {i}, µij and µji for j ∈ Ni the dual variables asso-
ciated with the set of equality constraints, the first set
of inequality constraints and the second set of inequality
constraints of (6), respectively. To reduce the computa-
tional burden and the accessible amount of information
of each generator, we let each generator i hold and up-
date (Pi, θi, λi, µij , j ∈ Ni) (so that λj and µji for each
j ∈ Ni are not held or updated by generator i, but by
generator j). By introducing Lagrange multipliers and
applying the projected gradient method, we can derive
the update rule in the form of problem (1) as follows:
Pi(k + 1) = P[P i,P i][Pi(k)− γ(k)(2aiPi(k) + bi
− λi(k))]
θi(k + 1) = θi(k)− γ(k)
∑
j∈Ni
(tij(λi(k) + µij(k))
− tij(λj(k) + µji(k)))
λi(k + 1) = λi(k) + γ(k)(Li − Pi(k) +Diω˜
+
∑
j∈Ni
tij(θi(k)− θj(k)))
µij(k + 1) = PR≥0 [µij(k) + γ(k)(tij(θi − θj)− P ij)].
• Privacy issue. Each generator i holds its primal and
dual variables (Pi, θi, λi, µij , j ∈ Ni) and the coefficients
(ai, bi, Li, P i, P i), whose values should be kept private
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Fig. 4. IEEE 37-bus Test System
to generator i. Otherwise, an adversary who knows the
current power system state could infer a critical contin-
gency and launch a targeted attack to implement it Da´n
et al. (2013). On the other hand, the energy manager (the
system operator) holds the line-dependent coefficients
(P ij , Di, tij) whose values should be kept private to the
energy manager. In power systems, the line-dependent
coefficients are often very important to the system op-
erator for security consideration. Leaks of these coeffi-
cients could be financially damaging and cause potential
threat to national security Borden et al. (2013), Bor-
den et al. (2012). For example, an adversary could lever-
age such information to infer expected congestion in the
power system and use this knowledge for insider trading
in the power markets Da´n et al. (2013).
6.2.2 Simulation results
We use the IEEE 37-bus Test System Report (1991),
shown by Fig. 4, as the OPF network. The values of
the parameters are chosen as follows: for all i ∈ V,
Di = 1MW/Hz, tij = 1.5MW/rad, ai = 0.1, bi = 10,
P i = 100MW , P i = 10MW , PLi = 10MW and P ij =
80MW . We tested different lengths of keys and have
checked that Assumption 4.2 is satisfied for all the tested
cases.
• Perfect correctness. We stack the collective primal
and dual variables (P, θ, λ, µ) into a single column
vector η. Similar simulation process of Algorithm 1
is performed here. Fig. 5 shows the trajectories of
‖ηprivacy(k) − η˜plain‖ and ‖ηprivacy(k) − ηplain(k)‖,
which verify the perfect correctness of Algorithm 2.
• Computational efficiency. The running time is shown
by Table 4. The first column is the length of the public
key αi’s in bit. The average and maximum time per iter-
ation per generator in the second and third columns con-
sists of a single generator’s encryption, encrypted com-
putation, decryption, transformation between real num-
bers and integers and local update for a single iteration.
Fig. 5. Trajectories of ‖ηprivacy(k) − η˜plain‖ and
‖ηprivacy(k)− ηplain(k)‖
Table 4
Running time of Algorithm 2 on the OPF problem
Key length average time maximum time
(bit) /iter./generator (s) /iter./generator (s)
500 0.0147 0.0193
1000 0.0424 0.0461
2000 0.2168 0.2492
3000 0.6825 0.7461
4000 1.5487 1.7259
Table 2 shows that the proposed public key secure com-
putation algorithm can be efficiently implemented.
7 Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs of the theoretical
results derived in the previous sections.
7.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
PROOF. 1) Proof of correctness.
We first fix a step k and some I ∈ V and J ∈ {1, · · · , nI}
to show that ΦˆsIJ(k) = ΦIJ(x(k)). Recall that 10
σx(k)
and 10σc are both integer vectors.
For each ` = 1, · · · , κIJ , Q`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ) is a monomial
evaluated at (xˆ(k), yˆ). Since yˆSO = 10
σcSO and, for each
i ∈ V, yˆi = uyiw+10σci and xˆi(k) = uxi(k)w+10σxi(k),
Q`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ) can be expressed as
Q`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ) = ψ
`
IJ(k)w + 10
deg(Q`IJ )σQ`IJ(x(k), c) (7)
where ψ`IJ(k) is an integer. To see this, consider the ex-
ampleQ`IJ(x, y) = yIxI , where yI and xI are assumed to
be scalars for simplicity. Then, deg(Q`IJ) = 2. We have
Q`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ) = yˆI xˆI(k)
= (uyIw + 10
σcI)(uxI (k)w + 10
σxI(k))
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= (uyIuxI (k)w + 10
σ(xI(k)uyI + cIuxI (k)))w
+ 102σcIxI(k) = ψ
`
IJ(k)w + 10
deg(Q`IJ )σQ`IJ(x(k), c)
where ψ`IJ(k) = uyIuxI (k)w+10
σ(xI(k)uyI +cIuxI (k)).
By (7), for each ` = 1, · · · , κIJ , we then have
10(deg(Φ
s
IJ )−deg(Q`IJ ))σQ`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ)
= ρ`IJ(k)w + 10
deg(ΦsIJ )σQ`IJ(x(k), c) (8)
where ρ`IJ(k) = 10
(deg(ΦsIJ )−deg(Q`IJ ))σψ`IJ(k) is an inte-
ger. By (8), we can further obtain
Φ¯sIJ(k) =
∑κIJ
`=1
[10(deg(Φ
s
IJ )−deg(Q`IJ ))σQ`IJ(xˆ(k), yˆ)]
= w
∑κIJ
`=1
ρ`IJ(k) + 10
deg(ΦsIJ )σ
∑κIJ
`=1
Q`IJ(x(k), c)
= ςIJ(k)w + 10
deg(ΦsIJ )σΦIJ(x(k)) (9)
where ςIJ(k) =
∑κIJ
`=1 ρ
`
IJ(k) is an integer. By (9)
Φ¯sIJ(k) mod w = 10
deg(ΦsIJ )σΦIJ(x(k)) mod w. (10)
By Assumption 3.1, |10deg(ΦsIJ )σΦIJ(x(k))| < (w − 1)/2.
By Lemma 2.1, we then have ΦˆsIJ(k) = Tdeg(ΦsIJ )σ,w
(10deg(Φ
s
IJ )σΦIJ(x(k)) mod w) = ΦIJ(x(k)). The
above analysis holds for Φij(x(k)) for any k and (i, j).
Hence, for each k and i ∈ V, we have Φˆsi (k) = Φi(x(k)).
2) Proof of security.
The security proof adopts the simulation paradigm
which is a standard technique for proving SMC Cramer
et al. (2015), Lindell and Pinkas (2009). First we
show by Definition 2.2 that Algorithm 1 securely com-
putes {Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))} between the agents.
During each step k of the execution of Algorithm 1,
for each i ∈ V, agent i only receives Φ¯si (k). Thus,
the view of agent i during step k of Algorithm 1 is
VIEWi(k) = {xi(k), CiΦ, Xi, σ, w, uxi(k), uyi , Φ¯si (k),
Φi(x(k))}, where xi(k), CiΦ, Xi, σ, w, uxi(k) and
uyi are inputs of agent i and Φi(x(k)) is agent i’s
output which can be inferred from Φ¯si (k) by the
correctness analysis. We need to construct an algo-
rithm S by which, for each i ∈ V, given agent i’s
inputs {xi(k), CiΦ, Xi, σ, w, uxi(k), uyi} and output
Φi(x(k)), agent i can generate a set of data S(i, k)
such that S(i, k)
c≡VIEWi(k). Agent i then only has
to simulate Φ¯si (k), i.e., to generate Φ¯
s
i (k)
′ by S such
that {Φ¯si (k)′}
c≡{Φ¯si (k)}. By (9), we have Φ¯sij(k) =
ςij(k)w + 10
deg(Φsij)σΦij(x(k)). Since each agent ` ran-
domly chooses ux`(k) and uy` , ςij(k) is a random num-
ber to agent i. Let c¯i and c¯−i be the vectors of the
elements of CiΦ and CΦ\CiΦ, respectively. Agent i sim-
ulates Φ¯si (k) as follows. First, agent i generates x−i(k)
′
and c¯′−i such that Φ
s
i (xi(k), x−i(k)
′, c¯i, c¯′−i) = Φi(x(k)).
Then, agent i randomly chooses (ux−i(k)
′, u′y−i) fol-
lowing the same distribution as (ux−i(k), uy−i) and
computes xˆi(k) = uxi(k)w + xi(k), yˆi = uyiw + c¯i,
xˆ−i(k)′ = ux−i(k)
′w + x−i(k)′ and yˆ′−i = u
′
y−iw + c¯
′
−i.
Agent i then computes Φ¯si (k)
′ in the same way as that of
line 6 of Algorithm 1 by using {xˆi(k), xˆ−i(k)′, yˆi, yˆ′−i}.
By the same arguments in the correctness analysis
part, we have Φ¯sij(k)
′ = ςij(k)′w+ 10deg(Φ
s
ij)σΦij(x(k)),
where ςij(k)
′ is an integer which has the same distri-
bution with ςij(k). Thus, we have {Φ¯si (k)′}
c≡{Φ¯si (k)}.
By Definition 2.2, Algorithm 1 securely computes
{Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))} between the agents.
Next we show that Algorithm 1 is as hard as the approx-
imate GCD problem for the system operator to solve
x(k) and cV at each step k. Under Assumption 3.2, at
each step k, the system operator knows xˆ(k) = ux(k)w+
10σx(k) and yˆ = uyw+10
σcV . To infer x(k) and cV from
xˆ(k) and yˆ, the system operator has to recover the value
of w, which is exactly the approximate GCD problem.
7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.1
PROOF. 1) Proof of correctness.
For each step k and compatible (i, `), since Φ¯si`(k) =
(β10
2σBi` mod αi
i
∏N
j=1
∏nj
v=1 xˆ
i
jv(k)
10σAjv
i`
mod αi) mod
α2i , by (3) of Theorem 9.1, we have
(Φ¯si`(k)
ν mod α2i )−1
αi
·pii
mod αi = 10
2σ(Ai`x(k) + Bi`) mod αi. By Assump-
tion 4.2, 102σ|Ai`x(k) + Bi`| ≤ (αi − 1)/2. By Lemma
2.1, we have Φˆsi`(k) = T2σ,αi(10
2σ(Ai`x(k) + Bi`)
mod αi) = Ai`x(k) + Bi` = Φi`(x(k)). The above anal-
ysis holds for any step k and any pair (i, `). Hence, for
each step k and each i ∈ V, we have Φˆsi (k) = Φi(x(k)).
2) Proof of security.
We first show by Definition 2.2 that Algorithm 2 se-
curely computes {Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))} between
the agents. During each step k of the execution of Algo-
rithm 2, for each i ∈ V, agent i only receives Φ¯si (k) and
VIEWi(k) = {xi(k), σ, αi, βi, νi, pii, Φ¯si (k),Φi(x(k))}.
We need to construct an algorithm S by which, given
agent i’s inputs {xi(k), σ, αi, βi, νi, pii} and output
Φi(x(k)), agent i can generate a set of data S(i, k) such
that S(i, k)
c≡VIEWi(k). Again, agent i only has to gen-
erate Φ¯si (k)
′ by S such that {Φ¯si (k)′}
c≡{Φ¯si (k)}. Agent
i simulates Φ¯si (k) as follows. First, agent i generates
x−i(k)′ and (A′i, B
′
i) such that Φ
s
i (xi(k), x−i(k)
′, A′i, B
′
i)
= Φi(x(k)). Then, for each j ∈ V\{i}, agent i ran-
domly chooses rj(k)
′ where each rj`(k)′ ∈ Z∗αi and en-
crypts xj(k)
′ by line 4 of Algorithm 2 to obtain xˆj(k)′.
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Then, agent i computes Φ¯si (k)
′ in the same way as
line 5 of Algorithm 2 by using (xˆi(k), xˆ−i(k)′, A′i, B
′
i).
For each j = 1, · · · , ni, by (3) of Theorem 9.1,
we have that Φ¯sij(k)
′ satisfies the decryption cor-
rectness, i.e.,
(Φ¯sij(k)
′ν mod α2i )−1
αi
· pii mod αi =
102σΦij(x(k)) mod αi. Hence, {Φ¯si (k)′}
c≡{Φ¯si (k)}.
By Definition 2.2, Algorithm 2 securely computes
{Φ1(x(k)), · · · ,ΦN (x(k))} between the agents.
We next show that Algorithm 2 is semantically secure
against the system operator. During the execution of Al-
gorithm 2, at each step k, the system operator receives
N encrypted vectors of x(k), each one encrypted by a
different set of Paillier keys. By Theorem 9.1, the Paillier
encryption scheme is semantically secure for encrypting
a plaintext a single time. Then, by Theorem 5.2.10 of
Goldreich (2004), the Paillier encryption scheme is also
semantically secure for encrypting a messageN times by
different keys against an adversary who knows all the N
ciphertexts. Denote by E(·) the encryption operator of
Algorithm 2. By Definition 2.3, to the system operator,
E(x)
c≡E(x′) for any plaintexts x, x′ even if the system
operator knows x and x′. Thus, to the system operator,
E(x(k))
c≡E(x(k + κ)) for any k and any κ even if the
system operator knows x(k) and x(k + κ) or any rela-
tion between x(k) and x(k + κ). Hence, even if the sys-
tem operator knows the update rule of x(k) and launchs
causal attacks, Algorithm 2 is still semantically secure.
This establishes the semantic security of Algorithm 2.
7.3 Proof of Theorem 5.1
PROOF. We focus on an adversary i ∈ V. By Defini-
tion 2.4, we are to show that agent i cannot uniquely
determine ({x−i(0), · · · , x−i(K)}, X−i, [Bj`](j,`)∈Ω′
i
)
and the uncertainty is unbounded for any K ∈ N.
For each j ∈ V and ` = 1, · · · , nj , denote the true
(Xj`, Bj`, {xj`(0), · · · , xj`(K)}) by (X¯j`, B¯j`, {x¯j`(0),
· · · , x¯j`(K)}). Up to step k, agent i knows X¯i, Hj`
and Aj` for all j ∈ V and ` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}, Bj`
for (j, `) ∈ Ωi, the sequences {x¯i(0), · · · , x¯i(k)},
{Φi(x¯(0)), · · · ,Φi(x¯(k))} and {γ(0), · · · , γ(k)}. For
convenience of notation, let xˆi(k) = x¯i(k) for all k ∈
{0, · · · ,K}. We aim to find (Xˆ−i, {xˆ−i(0), · · · , xˆ−i(K)},
[Bˆj`](j,`)∈Ω′
i
) which satisfy the following constraints:
xˆj`(k + 1) = PXˆj` [xˆj`(k)− γ(k)xˆ(k)THj`xˆ(k)
+Aj`xˆ(k) + B¯j`)], ∀(j, `) ∈ Ωi, j 6= i,
` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}, k ∈ {0, · · · ,K − 1}, (11)
xˆj`(k + 1) = PXˆj` [xˆj`(k)− γ(k)xˆ(k)THj`xˆ(k)
+Aj`xˆ(k) + Bˆj`)], ∀(j, `) ∈ Ω′i, j 6= i,
` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}, k ∈ {0, · · · ,K − 1}, (12)

Φi`(x¯(k)) = xˆ(k)
THi`xˆ(k) +Ai`xˆ(k) + B¯i`,
∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, ` ∈ {1, · · · , ni}, if (i, `) ∈ Ωi,
Φi`(x¯(k)) = xˆ(k)
THi`xˆ(k) +Ai`xˆ(k) + Bˆi`,
∀k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, ` ∈ {1, · · · , ni}, if (i, `) ∈ Ω′i.
(13)
Consider the following construction: xˆj(k) = x¯j(k) + δj
for each j ∈ V and each k ∈ {0, · · · ,K}, where δi = 0,
and for each j 6= i, δj ∈ Rnj is an arbitrary constant
vector such that each entry of each δj is nonzero and
[(H−i)T , (A−i)T ]T δ−i = 0, with δ−i = [δv]v 6=i; Xˆj =
{xj + δj : xj ∈ X¯j} for each j 6= i; Bˆj` = B¯j` −Aj`δ for
each (j, `) ∈ Ω′i with δ = [δv]v∈V . Assumption 5.2 guar-
antees the existence of the above set of δj ’s. By the def-
inition of H−i and A−i given in the fourth paragraph of
Section 5, we have (Huvj` +(H
vu
j` )
T )δv = 0 for all possible
quadruples (j, `, u, v), and Aj`δ = 0 for all (j, `) ∈ Ωi.
First we consider the case where j 6= i and (j, `) ∈ Ωi.
By this construction, for each step k, it holds that:
PXˆj` [xˆj`(k)− γ(k)(xˆ(k)THj`xˆ(k) +Aj`xˆ(k) + B¯j`)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(
∑N
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) + δu)
T
Huvj` (x¯v(k) + δv) +
∑N
v=1
Avj`(x¯v(k) + δv) + B¯j`)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(x¯(k)THj`x¯(k) +Aj`x¯(k)+
B¯j` +
N∑
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) +
1
2
δu)
T (Huvj` + (H
vu
j` )
T )δv +Aj`δ)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(x¯(k)THj`x¯(k) +Aj`x¯(k)
+ B¯j`)] = x¯j`(k + 1) + δj` = xˆj`(k + 1),
∀(j, `) ∈ Ωi, j 6= i, ` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}. (14)
Next we consider the case where j 6= i and (j, `) ∈ Ω′i.
By the above construction, for each step k, it holds that:
PXˆj` [xˆj`(k)− γ(k)(xˆ(k)THj`xˆ(k) +Aj`xˆ(k) + Bˆj`)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(
∑N
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) + δu)
THuvj`
(x¯v(k) + δv) +
∑N
v=1
Avj`(x¯v(k) + δv) + B¯j` −Aj`δ)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(x¯(k)THj`x¯(k) +Aj`x¯(k)
+ B¯j` +
N∑
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) +
1
2
δu)
T (Huvj` + (H
vu
j` )
T )δv)]
= PXˆj` [x¯j`(k) + δj` − γ(k)(x¯(k)THj`x¯(k) +Aj`x¯(k)
+ B¯j`)] = x¯j`(k + 1) + δj` = xˆj`(k + 1),
∀(j, `) ∈ Ω′i, j 6= i, ` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}. (15)
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We next consider the case where (i, `) ∈ Ωi. By the above
construction, for each step k, it holds that:
xˆ(k)THi`xˆ(k) +Ai`xˆ(k) + B¯i`
= (x¯(k) + δ)THi`(x¯(k) + δ) +Ai`(x¯(k) + δ) + B¯i`
= x¯(k)THi`x¯(k) +Ai`x¯(k) + B¯i`
+
∑N
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) +
1
2
δu)
T (Huvi` + (H
vu
i` )
T )δv +Ai`δ
= x¯(k)THi`x¯(k) +Ai`x¯(k) + B¯i` = Φi`(x¯(k)),
∀` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}, if (i, `) ∈ Ωi. (16)
Finally we consider the case where (i, `) ∈ Ω′i. By the
above construction, for each step k, it holds that:
xˆ(k)THi`xˆ(k) +Ai`xˆ(k) + Bˆi`
= (x¯(k) + δ)THi`(x¯(k) + δ) +Ai`(x¯(k) + δ) + B¯i`
−Ai`δ = x¯(k)THi`x¯(k) +Ai`x¯(k) + B¯i`
+
∑N
u,v=1
(x¯u(k) +
1
2
δu)
T (Huvi` + (H
vu
i` )
T )δv
= x¯(k)THi`x¯(k) +Ai`x¯(k) + B¯i` = Φi`(x¯(k)),
∀` ∈ {1, · · · , nj}, if (i, `) ∈ Ω′i. (17)
It is easy to see that (14) implies (11), (15) implies (12),
and (16) and (17) imply (13). Thus, the above construc-
tion of ({xˆ−i(0), · · · , xˆ−i(K)}, Xˆ−i, [Bˆj`](j,`)∈Ω′
i
) satis-
fies (11), (12) and (13). By the definition of ∆ij in Defini-
tion 2.4, we have ({xˆj(0), · · · , xˆj(K)}, Xˆj , [Bˆj`](j,`)∈Ω′
i
) ∈
∆ij({x¯(0), · · · , x¯(K)}, X¯, B¯) for each j 6= i. Fix any set
of δj ’s constructed above. Then for an arbitrary nonzero
real number r, rδ also satisfies the condition given in As-
sumption 5.2, i.e., [(H−i)T , (A−i)T ]T rδ−i = 0, and thus
the construction of ({xˆj(0), · · · , xˆj(K)}, Xˆj , Bˆ) by re-
placing δj with rδj also belongs to ∆
i
j({x¯(0), · · · , x¯(K)},
X¯, B¯). Notice that each entry of each rδj is nonzero and
could be arbitrarily large by choosing r arbitrarily large.
Hence, by the definition of Distij in Definition 2.4, for
each j 6= i, we have Distij({x¯(0), · · · , x¯(K)}, X¯, B¯) ≥
supr∈R ‖rδj − δj‖2 =∞. Since the above analysis holds
for any i ∈ V, we have mini 6=j Distij({x¯(0), · · · , x¯(K)},
X¯, B¯) = ∞ for any j ∈ V. By Definition 2.4, the
sequence of functions {Φ(x(0)), · · · ,Φ(x(K))} resists
input-output inference with unbounded uncertainty for
any K ∈ N. This completes the proof.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies how to securely execute a class of
distributed projected gradient-based algorithms. We
propose new homomorphic encryption based schemes
which can achieve perfect correctness and simultane-
ously protect each participant’s states and coefficients
from any other participant. We further study the issue
of input-output inference for a class of quadratic joint
functions. The correctness and computational efficiency
of the proposed algorithms are verified by two case stud-
ies of power systems, one on a demand response problem
and the other on an optimal power flow problem. An
interesting future work is to relax the assumption of
temporarily independent attacks (Assumption 3.2) for
Algorithm 1.
9 Appendix
9.1 Literature review on homomorphic encryption
In general, there are two ways to categorize homomor-
phic encryption schemes. The first way is based on the
keys used in the encryption and decryption operations.
Roughly speaking, if the same key is used for both en-
cryption and decryption, then the scheme is referred to
as a private key homomorphic encryption scheme; if the
keys for encryption and decryption are different and it
is computationally infeasible to compute the decryption
key from the encryption key, then the scheme is referred
to as a public key homomorphic encryption scheme.
The second way of categorization is based on the alge-
braic operations a homomorphic encryption scheme can
carry out. If a scheme can only carry out either addition
or multiplication operation but cannot simultaneously
carry out both, then the scheme is said to be partially
homomorphic; if a scheme can simultaneously carry out
both addition and multiplication operations, then the
scheme is said to be fully homomorphic.
Table 5 summarizes the state-of-the-art of the four types
of homomorphic encryption schemes. Private key fully
homomorphic (and surely partially homomorphic) en-
cryption schemes can be efficiently implemented but suf-
fer from the fundamental key distribution problem: the
message sender and receiver need to share a key which
must be kept unknown to any third party. In practice,
the key distribution is usually achieved via face-to-face
meeting, use of a trusted courier, or sending the key
through an existing secure channel. On the other hand,
public key homomorphic encryption schemes have the
significant advantage of resolving the key distribution
problem since the encryption key can be publicized. To
the best of our knowledge, all current efficiently imple-
mentable public key homomorphic encryption schemes
are partially homomorphic, e.g., the RSA scheme Rivest
et al. (1978) and the ElGamal scheme ElGamal (1985)
are multiplicatively homomorphic, and the Goldwasser–
Micali scheme Goldwasser and Micali (1982) and the
Paillier scheme Paillier (1999) are additively homomor-
phic. The first fully public key homomorphic encryption
scheme was developed by Gentry in his seminal work
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Table 5
Summary of different types of homomorphic encryption schemes
Partially homomorphic Fully homomorphic
Private key Key dist. prob. exists; Efficiently implementable Key dist. prob. exists; Efficiently implementable
Public key No key dist. prob.; Efficiently implementable No key dist. prob.; Not efficiently implementable
Gentry (2009). However, due to that the Gentry fully
homomorphic encryption scheme uses lattice and boot-
strapping, its implementation is overwhelmingly time-
consuming. Benchmark implementations include: Gen-
try et al. (2012) reported an AES (Advanced Encryp-
tion Standard) encryption on a supercomputer which
took 36 hours; in Gentry and Halevi (2011), bootstrap-
ping ranged from 30 seconds for small setting to 30 min-
utes for large setting. The current lack of efficient imple-
mentations largely limits the applications of the Gentry
fully homomorphic encryption scheme Armknecht et al.
(2015).
9.2 Preliminaries for the Paillier encryption scheme
In this subsection, we provide some preliminaries for the
Paillier encryption scheme. The results of this subsection
can be found in Paillier (1999) and Yi et al. (2014).
Consider a scenario consisting of a message sender, a
message receiver and an adversary. The message sender
aims to send a private message to the message receiver
via an open communication link which is insecure and
can be eavesdropped by the adversary. To achieve se-
cure message delivery, the message sender and receiver
can adopt some public key encryption scheme. In this
paper, we choose the Paillier encryption scheme as our
implementing scheme. The standard Paillier encryption
scheme consists of key generation, encryption and de-
cryption operations as follows.
• Key generation: The message receiver randomly
chooses two large prime numbers p and q such
that gcd(pq, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1; computes α =
pq, ν = lcm(p − 1, q − 1); select random integer
β ∈ Z∗α2 such that the modular multiplicative in-
verse pi = ( (β
ν mod α2)−1
α )
−1 mod α exists, i.e.,
pi (β
ν mod α2)−1
α ≡ 1 mod α. The public keys are (α, β)
and the private keys are (ν, pi). The message receiver
publicizes (α, β) while keeps (ν, pi, p, q) private to itself.
• Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext pt ∈ Zα, the mes-
sage sender selects a random number r ∈ Z∗α and com-
putes the ciphertext by the encryption operation E(·)
as ct = E(pt, α, β, r) = βpt · rα mod α2. The message
sender then sends ct to the message receiver.
• Decryption: To decrypt the ciphertext ct ∈ Zα2 , the
message receiver performs the decryption operationD(·)
as pt = D(ct, α, ν, pi) = (ct
ν mod α2)−1
α · pi mod α.
In cryptography, the security of most public-key encryp-
tion schemes are established under certain mathemati-
cal assumptions which state that certain mathematical
problems are difficult to solve. Specifically, the seman-
tic security of the Paillier encryption scheme is proved
under the decisional composite residuosity assumption
(DCRA), stated as follows: Given a composite C and
an integer z, it is computationally intractable to decide
whether z is a C-residue modulo C2 or not, i.e., whether
there exists y such that z = yC mod C2.
The correctness, security and homomorphic properties
of the Paillier encryption scheme are provided by the fol-
lowing theorem, whose proof is given in Paillier (1999).
Theorem 9.1 By the Paillier encryption scheme, the
following claims hold:
(1) Correctness: pt = pt.
(2) Semantic security: If the DCRA holds, then the Pail-
lier encryption scheme is semantically secure.
(3) Homomorphic properties:
(3-i) Given any pt1, · · · , ptm ∈ N. If
∑m
`=1 pt` ∈ Zα,
then D(
∏m
`=1E(pt`, α, β, r`), α, ν, pi) =
∑m
`=1 pt`.
(3-ii) Given any pt1, pt2 ∈ N. If pt1pt2 ∈ Zα, then
D(E(pt1, α, β, r)
pt2 , α, ν, pi) = pt1pt2.
9.3 Numerical examples for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2
In this subsection, to help the readers better understand
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, we go through their steps
using two simple numerical examples.
9.3.1 A numerical example for Algorithm 1
Consider the case of two agents and a system operator.
The accuracy level is set as σ = 2. Each agent i ∈ {1, 2}
has a scalar state xi ∈ R. The polynomial joint func-
tion of agent 1 is Φ1(x1, x2) = c1x
2
1 + c2x
2
2 + c3x1x2 +
c4x1 + c5, where c1, c3, c4 ∈ R are the private coeffi-
cients of agent 1, c2, c3 ∈ R are the private coefficients
of agent 2, and c5 ∈ R is the private coefficient of the
system operator. Notice that c3 is held by both agent 1
and agent 2. Assume that the participants construct a
partition of the coefficient set according to Section 3.1
as C˜1Φ = {c1, c3, c4}, C˜2Φ = {c2} and C˜SOΦ = {c5}. As-
sume c1 = 3.32, c2 = −1.53, c3 = 4.67, c4 = −0.28,
c5 = 2.42, x1(0) = 0.76, x2(0) = −2.35, X1 = R and
γ(0) = 1. One can check Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) = −12.665213.
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We next go through the steps of Algorithm 1 to compute
Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) for one iteration.
1. Initialization: Agent 1 holds x1(0) = 0.76 and
agent 2 holds x2(0) = −2.35.
2. Key agreement: Agent 1 and agent 2 agree on
a key w according to Assumption 3.1 and keep it
secret from the system operator. We have 1 + 2 ×
10deg(Φ
s
1)σ|Φ1(x1(0), x2(0))| = 1 + 2×103×2|3.32×
0.762 − 1.53× (−2.35)2 + 4.67× 0.76× (−2.35)−
0.28 × 0.76 + 2.42| = 25330427. Assume that the
key is chosen as w = 25400001.
3. Coefficient encryption: Agent 1 chooses uy1 =
103, uy3 = 307 and uy4 = 205, and encrypts
(c1, c3, c4) as yˆ1 = uy1w + 10
σc1 = 2616200435,
yˆ3 = uy3w + 10
σc3 = 7797800774 and yˆ4 =
uy4w + 10
σc4 = 5207000177, respectively. Agent
1 sends (yˆ1, yˆ3, yˆ4) to the system operator. Agent
2 chooses uy2 = 501 and encrypts c2 as yˆ2 =
uy2w + 10
σc2 = 12725400348. Agent 2 sends yˆ2
to the system operator. The system operator com-
putes yˆ5 = 10
σc5 = 242.
In the above step of coefficient encryption, the security
of (c1, c2, c3, c4) against the system operator is based on
the approximate GCD problem, whose definition is given
in footnote 1 in page 8. The approximate GCD problem
is widely believed to be NP-hard. In the above encryp-
tion, the system operator receives (yˆ1, yˆ2, yˆ3, yˆ4) from the
agents, where yˆ` = uy`w+ 10
σc` for each ` ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
To infer (c1, c2, c3, c4) from (yˆ1, yˆ2, yˆ3, yˆ4), the system
operator has to recover the value of w, which is exactly
the approximate GCD problem. Hence, it is as hard as
the approximate GCD problem for the system operator
to solve (c1, c2, c3, c4).
4. Consider the time instant k = 0 (we only go
through one iteration).
5. State encryption: Agent 1 chooses ux1(0) =
107, encrypts x1(0) as xˆ1(0) = ux1(0)w +
10σx1(0) = 2717800183, and sends xˆ1(0) to the
system operator. Agent 2 chooses ux2(0) = 409,
encrypts x2(0) as xˆ2(0) = ux2(0)w + 10
σx2(0) =
10388600174, and sends xˆ2(0) to the system oper-
ator.
Similar to the security of coefficients discussed above, for
the step of state encryption, it is as hard as the approx-
imate GCD problem for the system operator to solve
(x1(0), x2(0)) from (xˆ1(0), xˆ2(0)).
6. Computation over ciphertexts: The system
operator computes
Φ¯s1(0) =
5∑
v=1
[10(deg(Φ
s
1)−deg(Qv1))σQv1(xˆ(k), yˆ)]
= 10(3−3)×2 · yˆ1xˆ1(0)2 + 10(3−3)×2 · yˆ2xˆ2(0)2
+ 10(3−3)×2 · yˆ3xˆ1(0)xˆ2(0)
+ 10(3−2)×2 · yˆ4xˆ1(0) + 10(3−1)×2 · yˆ5
= 1612852152286627752945361608571.
The system operator sends Φ¯s1(0) to agent 1.
In the above step of computation over ciphertexts, we
multiply each monomial Qv1 by 10
(deg(Φs1)−deg(Qv1))σ to
addressed the challenge of sum operation over trans-
formed integers as mentioned in item (ii) of Section 3.2.
With the scaling terms, all the monomials are scaled by
(the same) 106 times and the sum operation between
them can be applied.
7. Decryption: Agent 1 computes Φˆs1(0) =
Tdeg(Φs1)σ,w(Φ¯
s
1(0) mod w). First, we compute
Φ¯s1(0) mod w = 12734788. We then have
12700001 = (w + 1)/2 ≤ Φ¯s1(0) mod w =
12734788 < w = 25400001. Hence, by (2), we have
Φˆs1(0) = Tdeg(Φs1)σ,w(Φ¯
s
1(0) mod w)
=
(Φ¯s1(0) mod w)− w
10deg(Φ
s
1)σ
=
12734788− 25400001
103×2
=
−12665213
106
= −12.665213.
The above result of decryption verifies the perfect cor-
rectness of Algorithm 1, i.e., Φˆs1(0) = Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) =−12.665213.
8. Local update: Agent 1 updates x1 by x1(1) =
PX1 [x1(0)− γ(0)Φˆs1(0)] = 13.425213.
9.3.2 A numerical example for Algorithm 2
Consider the case of two agents and a system opera-
tor. The accuracy level is set as σ = 2. Each agent
i ∈ {1, 2} has a scalar state xi ∈ R. The affine joint
function of agent 1 is Φ1(x1, x2) = A
1
1x1 + A
2
1x2 +
B1, where A
1
1, A
2
1, B1 ∈ R are coefficients known to
the system operator. Assume A11 = 2.45, A
2
1 = −3.03,
B1 = 5.22, x1(0) = 1.36, x2(0) = −1.42, X1 = R and
γ(0) = 1. One can check Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) = 12.8546. We
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next go through the steps of Algorithm 2 to compute
Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) for one iteration.
1. Initialization: Agent 1 holds x1(0) = 1.36 and
agent 2 holds x2(0) = −1.42.
2. Key generation: Agent 1 generates the Paillier
keys (α1, β1, ν1, pi1) such that α1 satisfies Assump-
tion 4.2. The procedure of Paillier key generation is
given in Section 9.2. We have 1+2×102σ|A11x1(0)+
A21x2(0)+B1| = 1+2×102×2|2.45×1.36+(−3.03)×
(−1.42) + 5.22| = 257093. Assume that agent 1
chooses two prime numbers p1 = 733 and q1 = 523.
Then, we have α1 = p1q1 = 383359 > 257093 and
ν1 = lcm(p1 − 1, q1 − 1) = 63684. Agent 1 chooses
β1 = α1 + 1 = 383360 ∈ Z∗α21 . We then have pi1 =
(
(β
ν1
1 mod α
2
1)−1
α1
)−1 mod α1 = 198247. Agent 1
publicizes (α1, β1) while keeps (ν1, pi1, p1, q1) pri-
vate to itself.
3. Consider the time instant k = 0 (we only go
through one iteration).
4. State encryption: Agent 1 selects r1(0) =
196827 ∈ Z∗α1 , encrypts x1(0) as xˆ1(0) =
β
10σx1(0) mod α1
1 ·r1(0)α1 mod α21 = 38891374903,
and sends xˆ1(0) to the system operator. Agent
2 selects r2(0) = 199762 ∈ Z∗α1 , encrypts x2(0)
as xˆ2(0) = β
10σx2(0) mod α1
1 · r2(0)α1 mod α21 =
112847502000, and sends xˆ2(0) to the system oper-
ator.
The above step of state encryption follows the standard
Paillier encryption operation. Since the Paillier encryp-
tion scheme is semantically secure, so is the above state
encryption against the system operator.
5. Computation over ciphertexts: The system
operator computes
Φ¯s1(0) = β
102σB1 mod α1
1 · xˆ1(0)10
σA11 mod α1
· xˆ2(0)10σA21 mod α1 mod α21
= 125129165734.
The system operator sends Φ¯s1(0) to agent 1.
6. Decryption: Agent 1 computes Φˆs1(0) =
T2σ,α1(
(Φ¯s1(0)
ν1 mod α21)−1
α1
· pi1 mod α1). First, we
compute
(Φ¯s1(0)
ν1 mod α21)−1
α1
·pi1 mod α1 = 128546.
Hence, 0 ≤ (Φ¯s1(0)ν1 mod α21)−1α1 · pi1 mod α1 =
128546 ≤ (α1 − 1)/2 = 191679. By (2), we have
Φˆs1(0)
= T2σ,α1(
(Φ¯s1(0)
ν1 mod α21)− 1
α1
· pi1 mod α1)
=
(Φ¯s1(0)
ν1 mod α21)−1
α1
· pi1 mod α1
102σ
=
128546
102×2
= 12.8546.
The above result of decryption verifies the perfect cor-
rectness of Algorithm 2, i.e., Φˆs1(0) = Φ1(x1(0), x2(0)) =
12.8546.
7. Local update: Agent 1 updates x1 by x1(1) =
PX1 [x1(0)− γ(0)Φˆs1(0)] = −11.4946.
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